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MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE LEFT

CARL DREHER

THE ATOMIC TALKS THE BERIA AFFAIR

THE EDITORS

THE OMINOUS PARALLEL

MARTIN HALL

THE SITUATION IN BRITAIN

AN ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

VOL. 5

10

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEEZY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

When we sent out advance proofsheets of "The Roots and Prospects of McCarthyism," we printed 5,000 extra to take care of anticipated orders from subscribers for additional copies. To our surprise, these 5,000 were snapped up immediately and orders continued to come in. Rather than reprint in the awkward and impermanent form of proofsheets, we decided to make the editorial into a pamphlet which is on the press as we write these lines. This will be No. 8 in MR's Pamphlet Series, and will sell at the following prices: single copies—10c, 12 copies—\$1, 25 copies—\$2, 75 copies—\$5. All unfilled orders on hand or yet to come will be filled with pamphlets at these prices.

(continued on inside back cover)

THE ATOMIC TALKS

The initiation of atomic talks between the United States and the Soviet Union poses two questions which must be answered if our thinking on the subject is to have any relevance and usefulness. First, in what direction is an agreement to be sought? And second, what general form might an agreement assume?

It is clear that Eisenhower's proposal for an international agency to promote the peaceable uses of atomic energy does not contain the answer to either question. The reason is not that the proposal *per se* is a bad thing: that issue need not arise at all. The reason is that the proposal is not addressed to the real problem, which is *not* the peaceable uses of atomic energy but how to control the atomic arms race and reduce the threat of atomic annihilation. This is now widely, and more or less frankly, admitted by all serious commentators—that is to say, by all except those who are interested in making cold-war capital out of the President's famous UN speech. Hanson Baldwin's verdict may be taken as representative:

President Eisenhower's proposal has no such ambitious goal [as the Baruch plan]. Even if it were accepted and implemented by the Russians . . . it could have only indirect, preliminary and psychological influence upon the world's atomic arms race.

What the President has suggested is the establishment under international auspices of an atomic energy pool for peaceful purposes. . . . But the major amount of fissionable material of each nation would still be utilized for military purposes, and there would be no control or restriction on atomic war. . . .

It is a limited approach to the control of unlimited war. . . . But in itself it solves nothing, and it must be complemented or followed by other measures if contemporary civilization is to live. (*New York Times*, January 13, 1954.)

The implication of this is clear enough: the really interesting and important problems concern these "other measures" and not the President's proposal.

The Baruch plan, of course, embodied an elaborate system of

"other measures," the outcome of which would have been, and doubtless was intended to be, the virtual assurance of a permanent monopoly of atomic weapons to the United States. The Soviet Union naturally would not agree, and countered with a proposal to place an absolute ban on the possession and manufacture of atomic weapons, which, for obvious reasons, was as unacceptable to the United States as the Baruch plan was to the Russians. For several years, all discussions of controlling atomic warfare ran in terms of these two contradictory positions—and got absolutely nowhere. The Russians were not going to give up their right to develop atomic weapons of their own, and the Americans were not going to give up the advantages which their headstart gave them.

The success of the Russians in making their own A-bombs changed all this. The Baruch plan became meaningless, and a complete ban on manufacture and possession of atomic weapons was no longer necessarily or obviously a way of greatly increasing the relative military strength of the Soviet Union. (What is often forgotten in this connection is that, in terms of geography and the distribution of population and industry, the United States is far more vulnerable to atomic attack than the Soviet Union.) This change in the underlying situation has now been followed, after a lag of several years, by a change in the positions of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

So far, the change in the American position has been entirely negative. The Baruch plan has been scrapped, but nothing positive has been offered in its place (as we have seen, the Eisenhower proposal is not a substitute for the Baruch plan). On the Soviet side, however, there has been a positive modification of the earlier policy. In its reply to Eisenhower's speech, and also in Malenkov's New Year message, the Soviet Union indicated that while its ultimate goal remains the total abolition of atomic weapons, it is now stressing as an immediate objective the banning of the *use*, not the manufacture and possession, of atomic weapons.

The situation at the moment can be summed up this way: The United States is in effect saying to the USSR, "We admit that the Baruch plan is obsolete and must be scrapped, and we are willing to talk about what to put in its place even though we have no positive suggestions as yet." The Soviet Union replies, "For the time being let us recognize each other's right to have atomic weapons, but let us agree not to use them, which would mean in practice that each of us would undertake not to use them except in retaliation for their prior use by the other."

If this is a correct assessment of the situation, the next question

is whether there is any chance that the United States will agree to the Soviet proposal for a ban on use of atomic weapons. The answer clearly is that there is no chance under present conditions. America's whole military policy is being increasingly geared to atomic weapons, and there is no significant segment of public opinion in this country today that would back a ban on their use. To be sure, these are not necessarily *permanent* obstacles to United States acceptance of a ban on use; they are bound to become weaker in proportion to the growth of Soviet atomic potential. To quote Hanson Baldwin again:

. . . we have . . . tended to reject it [prohibition of atomic weapons] on the assumption that our atomic advantage will endure, that we will be able to inflict devastating damage on Russia in future years without sustaining such damage ourselves. No matter how valid this argument may be today, it is totally lacking in realism tomorrow. . . . [In] the future any realistic approach to the problem of atomic control must probably recognize that a foolproof international inspection and guarantee system is impossible, but that ultimate restriction and/or prohibition of atomic arms is essential to the future of man. (*Times*, January 13.)

Actually, however, this suggests only part of the reason why the United States will not agree to banning atomic weapons under existing circumstances. For one thing it would mean a virtual concession of permanent military superiority in Europe to Soviet ground forces. An additional, and hardly less important reason, is that such an agreement would mean that the United States would be binding itself in advance not to use atomic weapons against any country which does not possess atomic weapons (since in relation to such a country the question of retaliation could not arise), and this in turn would mean a sharp shift in the balance of power in the Far East against the United States and in favor of China. Some day, when each of the big powers, including China, has atomic weapons in sufficient quantity to cripple any of the others, they may all be willing, in the interests of sheer self-preservation, to agree to a ban on their use. But as long as the United States is one of a very few powers with atomic weapons, and as long as it may fight a war against a power which does *not* have the capacity to retaliate, it would be utopian to expect Washington to promise not to use these weapons except in reprisal against their prior use by others.

If a total ban on use of atomic weapons is not attainable at this time, the question is whether there is any formula for defining certain conditions under which use of atomic weapons would be outlawed, a formula which would be potentially acceptable to this country and at the same time might form the basis of fruitful negotiations with

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the Soviet Union. Walter Lippmann, for one, apparently thinks that there is. In commenting on the Soviet reply to Eisenhower's speech, Lippmann writes:

The difference between us [the United States and the Soviet Union] now is that the USSR wishes to prohibit atomic warfare, whereas we wish to prohibit aggressive warfare, regardless of the weapons. The Soviet government wishes to confine the legitimate use of atomic weapons to a sanction against the use of atomic weapons; we, on the other hand, consider it legitimate to use these weapons to deter, and to retaliate against, aggression with conventional weapons. (*Herald Tribune*, December 24, 1953.)

On the face of it, this seems to suggest a reasonable formula: atomic weapons may be legitimately used only to combat an aggressor. But, of course, there is one great difficulty about it. What is aggression? And who is to decide when an act of aggression has been committed?

Past experience seems to suggest that no agreement on these questions can be expected between the Soviet Union and the United States. The USSR has long been trying to get the UN to go on record with a definition of aggression, and the insuperable obstacle has always been American opposition. On the other hand, in the two principal cases where organs of the UN have actually named countries as aggressors (North Korea in 1950 and China in 1951), the Soviet Union flatly refused to recognize the legitimacy of the procedure or the validity of the verdict. It would seem that all this is water over the dam and that there could hardly be anything more futile than reopening the related problems of defining aggression and identifying an aggressor. If this is where the search for atomic agreement leads, one might be tempted to argue, then the outlook is dark indeed.

And yet there is some reason to believe that this may be too pessimistic a view. Perhaps the American and Soviet approaches to the problem of aggression are not irreconcilable after all, and perhaps it is not impossible to devise a mutually acceptable procedure for identifying the aggressor. In other words, perhaps the real problem is whether there is a will to reach agreement. Let us examine these points a little more closely.

On January 8, 1951, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN Legal Committee a resolution which proposed to name as an aggressor "a state which declares war on another, or which invades its territory with armed forces even without a declaration of war."

This resolution got nowhere, primarily because of American opposition. And yet on November 7, 1953, American Ambassador to Moscow Charles Bohlen is reported to have proposed a toast at a dip-

lomatic reception in which he stated "that the formula for peace was simple: the first nation to cross the border of another with armed forces would be the guilty nation." (Dispatch by W. L. Ryan, AP correspondent recently returned from an extensive tour of the USSR, in *New York Times*, January 2, 1954.) Can this mean that the United States is now coming around to the view that it may be a good idea to define aggression after all? If so, what Bohlen said would seem to indicate that there is already sufficient in common between the American and Soviet views to make negotiation entirely feasible.

But who is to decide in a particular case whether an act of aggression has been committed? The United States view for some time has been that this is the function of the UN General Assembly, and it is well known that the Americans managed to push through the General Assembly a resolution branding China an aggressor early in 1951.

The fact that the Soviet Union refused to recognize the validity of this resolution might be taken to indicate that it would under no circumstances be willing to accept the idea of the General Assembly as the final arbiter on questions of aggression. A moment's reflection, however, will cast serious doubt on this conclusion. *If the use of atomic weapons had been at stake, and if the General Assembly had known it, it is inconceivable that China would have been declared an aggressor.* World public opinion is profoundly opposed to the use of atomic weapons, and the General Assembly does reflect world opinion, however imperfectly. Moreover, what used to be regarded as the United States' mechanical voting majority in the General Assembly is far from mechanical nowadays and is getting less so with every year that passes. If China and the other countries presently excluded from the UN were admitted, so that the organization would become what it is intended to be, a truly universal organization, it is by no means unthinkable that the Soviet Union might be willing to entrust the power to decide cases of aggression—and hence the power to legitimize use of atomic weapons—to the General Assembly. After all, from Moscow's point of view it would be much safer there than in Washington.

If we are right, both problems—definition of an aggressor and location of authority to name an aggressor—could, in principle, be solved as part of an American-Soviet agreement to outlaw use of atomic weapons except in cases of aggression.

But unfortunately this is not quite the end of the matter. Before such an agreement could become operative, certain preconditions would have to be met. We have already noted that the UN would have to be universalized before the USSR could be expected to agree

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to its having the power to name an aggressor. Nor is this all. If an aggressor is a nation that crosses the borders of another with armed forces, as implied in Bohlen's toast, then everyone concerned must agree on the precise delimitation of the borders of all states against which aggression might be committed.

What would seem to be required, then, is to *universalize the UN and settle, by mutual agreement, all outstanding questions regarding international boundaries*. It doesn't sound like very much perhaps, but when you stop to think about it, it really means ending the cold war. It means seating the Peking government in the UN and reaching an agreement with that government on the future status of Formosa. It means an end to the dispute over the Polish-German frontier. It means agreement on both the Korean and the German questions, either unifying those countries or definitely dividing them and establishing *international boundaries* between their two halves. It means definitive partition (or unification) of Kashmir. It means defining the boundaries of Israel. And so on and so forth. But these are precisely the issues over which all the world's wars, cold and hot, big and little, are being fought. It is by keeping them open, that the aggressive forces everywhere maintain excuses and pretexts for their machinations and plans. And by the same token, settling them would signalize the triumph of nonaggressive forces and would set the stage for a genuinely workable agreement to limit and control the use of atomic weapons.

It is wise to conclude on a note of caution. No settlements or agreements are in sight. There are, unfortunately, very few signs that any significant elements of the American ruling class understand what would be involved in an atomic agreement, and still fewer that our leaders are as yet ready to abandon their insane idea of winning the cold war in favor of the sensible idea of settling it. And yet the opening of atomic talks is a sure sign that they are baffled and worried, that their confidence in old policies is shaken, that they are looking for some way to diminish the threat of atomic annihilation which they are beginning to understand hangs over their own heads as much as, and perhaps even more than, it hangs over the heads of the Russians and Chinese.

This is the beginning of wisdom. A first step has been taken, a small one to be sure, but a necessary one. Let us hope that many others will follow along the road that leads to the end of the cold war and, beyond that, to the control and finally to the complete abolition of atomic weapons.

THE BERIA AFFAIR

It is now nearly a year since Stalin's death. Looking back over this eventful period, we can say, with little fear of future contradiction, that the changes in the Soviet Union have been massive, cumulative, and almost certainly irreversible.

The dominant trends, it seems to us, can be summed up under three headings:

First, improvement in the living standards and conditions of the Soviet citizenry. This was signalized, above all, by Malenkov's August speech outlining alterations in economic plans in favor of agriculture and consumers' goods. It has been most dramatically brought to the notice of the outside world by the increasingly large-scale entry of the USSR into foreign markets as a buyer of the things the Soviet consumer wants and needs. It is too early as yet to say how fast the rise of living standards will be pushed, but there can be no doubt that the Malenkov government has entered upon a course which it could not reverse, even if it wanted to, except in the face of a clear and imminent threat of war.

Second, liberalization of the political and cultural life of the nation. Probably the most important event in this connection—and one which received far less attention in this country than it deserved—was the sweeping amnesty of last spring which must have come close to wiping out the whole system of penal labor camps. But there have been many other evidences of the liberalization trend: the public exposure of secret police methods in the reversal of the doctors' case, the insistent emphasis in the Soviet press on the need to respect legality and the constitutional rights of the Soviet citizen, the strong and principled attacks on Zhdanovism by such eminent writers and artists as Ehrenburg and Katchaturian. These and similar developments in other spheres of Soviet life are clearly part of a general pattern and not mere isolated incidents.

Third, amelioration and multiplication of official and unofficial relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Most striking here, of course, has been the pressing of the "peace offensive" as the leitmotif of Soviet foreign policy from the very day of Stalin's funeral. But equally symptomatic, and probably more pregnant with long-run implications, have been the easing of restrictions on travel to and from the USSR, the diminution of suspicion and hostility in relations between Soviet citizens and foreigners, the release of Soviet wives of foreign husbands, the greatly increased two-way flow of economic and cultural delegations to and from the Soviet Union.

On the whole, then, the period since Stalin's death has been one of genuine progress. What has been happening in the Soviet Union is precisely what western liberals and socialists who never lost faith in the potentiality of the Russian Revolution have always believed would happen sooner or later. And it is the more gratifying and reassuring because it is happening at a time of grave international tension caused, in the final analysis, by the implacable hostility of the world's most powerful capitalist class, not to the ugly aspects of Soviet society but to its achievements and its boundless promise for the future.

This is the background against which we must attempt to analyze and interpret the Beria affair.

The only thing that seems to be generally accepted about the Beria affair is that he and some of his close colleagues in the secret police did try to use that particular arm of the Soviet government to seize control over the government as a whole. From available evidence, it is simply impossible to form an opinion about the policies they represented as against those which the Malenkov administration had already instituted and continued to put into effect after Beria's arrest. It has been argued, more or less plausibly, that Beria wanted a return to pure Stalinism; it has also been argued that he wanted to move faster than Malenkov in the direction of relaxation and liberalization. Both things can't be true, and it is possible that neither is true: Beria's bid for power may have been simple personal adventurism. (If this is indeed the case, we were certainly wrong to discount the possibility in our editorial "Stalin and the Future," MR, April 1953.) But whatever the motivation of the Beria group, there can be no doubt that their defeat meant a sharp setback for the secret police, and hardly any doubt that their victory would have necessitated sooner or later an intensification of the police-state regime.

The setback suffered by the secret police seems to have been fundamental and permanent. C. L. Sulzberger, chief of the *New York Times's* European staff, reported on January 11th—on the basis of "positive evidence" in the possession of "certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries"—that the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, which Beria had headed, has been stripped of some of its most important functions. The economic branch, which was in charge of penal labor camps, has been eliminated entirely, according to Sulzberger. (It never seems to occur to him to connect this with the amnesty, though the relation seems an obvious one.) And the sections charged with planning major construction projects and with building highways are said to have been transferred to the Electric Power Ministry and the Motor Transport Ministry respectively. All of this fits in logically with the trend to liberalization noted above and of

course will be warmly welcomed by everyone who hates secret police as a matter of principle.

At the same time, we cannot overlook that there is another side to the Beria affair which can only be described as repulsive. We do not refer to the conduct of the trial itself. It is quite understandable that under existing circumstances the Soviet government did not want to expose all the facts to public scrutiny, and a trial *in camera* is certainly vastly preferable to the kind of show trial that was such a painful accompaniment of pre-World War II struggles within the Communist Party and government. But what from our point of view is neither understandable nor excusable is the shoddy attempt to re-write history which has been as much a feature of this as of earlier affairs.

Like Trotsky and many others before him, Beria is accused of having been an agent of a foreign power from the early days of the Revolution. And in order to help make the charge stick, it is reported that subscribers to the *Soviet Encyclopedia* have been asked to cut out the article on Beria and substitute new pages from which all mention of one of the key figures of recent Soviet history has been completely expunged! The accusation is thoroughly implausible: if the Communist Party and the Soviet government had really been honeycombed with so many highly placed traitors from the outset, it is inconceivable that the regime could have survived at all. And we refuse to believe that the loyalty of the Soviet peoples to their present leadership depends on their being fed this kind of cooked-up history. After all, the leadership has magnificent achievements to its credit. It seems about time to recognize that one of those achievements is an adult citizenry.

If anyone wants to argue that such criticisms come with bad grace from the United States today, when nearly the whole of the American ruling class is engaged in a gigantic and obscene effort to rewrite the history of the last two decades, we must admit that he has a point. Those who paint the New Deal as a foreign plot and attribute the Chinese Revolution to Owen Lattimore have nothing to learn from Soviet rewriters of history. But those of us who have never ceased to insist that this sort of thing is degrading and corrupting when it happens here have a right, and indeed a duty, to say that it is no better when it happens elsewhere.

(January 17, 1954)

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE LEFT

BY CARL DREHER

On a Saturday afternoon in December, 1943, a sturdy-looking, middle-aged man with an expression of thoughtful pugnacity stood before an audience at the Hotel New Yorker. He was the chairman of a symposium on Soviet science, sponsored by what would now be called a Communist-front organization. The man was Harold C. Urey, the Nobel Prize-winning chemist. He was snatching a few hours from his labors on the atomic bomb. The audience, of course, knew nothing of this; they did know that the crucial question after the war would be the relationship between the United States and the USSR, and it seemed a good augury that a scientist of Urey's prominence should be officiating at a gathering whose avowed purpose was to promote American-Soviet understanding.

Three years later Urey broke off all such associations. The spectacle of an intellectual turning his back on the Left is scarcely a novelty in our day, but Urey is a novelty: after making the prescribed gestures of renunciation and anti-Communism, he swung back to *de facto* collaboration in the Rosenberg case. He did this strictly on his own, avoiding any direct association with the Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case. It was his independence of mind—in part—that alienated him from the Left, and it was again his independence, coupled with inability to take a philosophical view of injustice, which in the eyes of Senator McCarthy made him once more a fellow traveler. And indeed McCarthy had reason to be perturbed, for however aloof Urey's fellow traveling may have been, by the act itself he shook the web in which American intellectuals are caught. It is exceedingly important to McCarthy and his accomplices and competitors that the intellectual who has repudiated the Left should dedicate the rest of his life to self-stultifying conflict with it, that the point of departure should also be the point of no return.

The Rosenberg trauma will have long and lasting effects among thoughtful Americans—unless fascism squelches all thought and all

Carl Dreher was an engineer for twenty years and has been a writer for almost as many more. He has written many articles and stories and one book: The Coming Showdown.

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE LEFT

conscience. At the same time, the reaction of thoughtful Americans is one of the factors which will determine whether we are going to have fascism or not. If Urey, or another like him, should follow through the implications of the Rosenberg affair and all that has happened since, he might conceivably cast himself in a political role more important than all his scientific contributions.

But even if nothing more comes of it, in the light of the Rosenberg case Urey's political history is highly significant. Except that he has more courage than most, Urey is the prototype of the American intellectual functioning successfully within the going system, the defects of which he sees but from which he will not fly to what he regards as greater evils. If we on the Left cannot win—and keep—the confidence and cooperation of the Ureys, our chances of political survival are small indeed. And theirs likewise.

The great clichés are mostly true, and the truest and, to the American socialist, the most handicapping, is that a man has only one life to live and usually prefers to live it as comfortably as possible within the framework of things-as-they-are. We should all prefer to be secure rather than insecure, respectable rather than disreputable, well fed rather than hungry, and to do interesting work rather than drudgery. The intellectual is, moreover, even more precariously poised than most men; thought requires a degree of physical comfort, or one can think of nothing but physical comfort. To practice his profession, the intellectual, like the factory worker, requires access to expensive facilities which he does not own. In a machine civilization like ours, the more interesting vocations can't possibly accommodate all the aspirants; consequently the owning or managerial groups are free to hire and fire on the basis of political compatibility as well as professional capacity. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that most intellectuals conform. Having conformed, they find their dignity at stake as well as their livelihood, and they defend the existing order with a vehemence they never manifested when they were social revolutionaries. There is only one thing wrong with this new loyalty of theirs, so much safer and saner than the old one: conformity distorts and in the end destroys the intellectual's philosophical and ethical reason for being, which is to seek, teach, and apply the truth. And conformity feeds on itself, until, in the name of freedom, not the slightest latitude is left in the things that really matter.

A Urey, as distinguished from the ordinary Ph.D., is spared the necessity of turning his coat that he may work and live. When Urey broke with the Left, it was for reasons of his own and not because of the impending displeasure of the trustees. The pressure to conform is naturally greater on the ordinary intellectual than on Nobel Prize

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winners and such. But even a Urey, should he go his own way, and especially should he offend the political mores in some conspicuous and publicity-laden instance, will tend to become a problem to the controllers, who cannot afford to let one professor run loose while keeping the rest on the leash. If the deviator subsides, busies himself once more with the problems of his speciality—or any problems that do not affect the interests of big property—his aberration may be overlooked. But events and conscience may again force him into the headlines, for the conflict between what is and what ought to be is irrepressible. Whether Urey, in particular, desires to assume further risks and responsibilities of this sort is his affair, but the materials of his political past are available for the education of American progressives, including himself.

Urey was born in Indiana in 1893. His father, a minister, died when he was six years old. In youth the son was a ditchdigger and farmer. His higher education was financed with the greatest difficulty. He intended to be a zoologist but when he received his B.S. degree (from the University of Montana in 1917) chemists were needed. He remained a chemist, but in the capacity of teacher and "pure" researcher. Among advanced chemists and physicists he was already well known in 1931 when, with his assistants F. G. Brickwedde and G. M. Murphy, he announced the discovery of deuterium (hydrogen of atomic weight two.)

Nothing could be more instructive to the pioneering scientist than a complex form of the simplest atom. Deuterium led to heavy water (deuterium oxide) and tritium (hydrogen of atomic weight three.) The hydrogen bomb utilizes both deuterium and tritium. Although Urey may have had little to do with its actual development, nevertheless it is he who pried open the lid of the biggest Pandora's box of all.

He did have a great deal to do with the development of the uranium-plutonium bomb. In the Smyth report, Urey's name leads all the rest in the number of references in the index: 28. Vannevar Bush has 24, Fermi and E. O. Lawrence 23 each. Of course the number of references has only a tenuous relation to accomplishment—J. R. Oppenheimer has nine, J. R. Dunning five—but Urey's services, both administrative and technical, were certainly outstanding. But for his progression from farm boy to zoologist to chemist to atomic scientist, the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki could not have occurred quite as soon as they did.

All of which may help to explain why Urey has what used to be called "social consciousness." He already had it when the atomic bomb was no more than a science-fiction fantasy; during the thirties

he supported the Spanish Loyalists and gave aid to refugees from fascism. That could be ascribed to old-fashioned Americanism, but it may have been his anticipation of success in the atomic project—in the fall of 1943 it was already some four years old—that impelled him to efforts in the direction of United States-USSR rapprochement. When it did succeed, he was forced deeply into politics. He worked five years (1940-1945) to make the uranium bomb, and another five years (1945-1950) to prevent its use in another war, before he became, reluctantly, a propagandist for the development of the hydrogen bomb.

Right or wrong, Urey's thought has a seminal quality, and during those years he said many things that were noteworthy and some that were prophetic. On December 5, 1945, he spoke before a capacity crowd of 19,000 at a Madison Square Garden rally under the auspices of the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts and Sciences (now the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions.) He urged that the manufacture and stockpiling of atomic bombs and other weapons of mass destruction be forbidden, a proposal which the Russians have been making ever since. A month later his famous article, "I Am a Frightened Man," (as told to Michael Armine) appeared in *Colliers*. In it he declared there must never be another war and called for patriotism "not to one country but to the human race." The Russians, he was sure, wanted nothing more than peace. In March, 1946, he assailed the Manhattan District of the Corps of Engineers for assertedly flouting the Bill of Rights; in the same interview he deplored spy scares and declared there was no such thing as the "secret" of the atomic bomb. If there were, he added, no particular blame would attach to the Russians for trying to steal it, for, "as the world is organized, all nations will spy, including our own."

But in August, in an article in *Air Affairs*, he suggested that if some form of international control of atomic explosives were not agreed on, it might become a "strict necessity" for the United States to launch an atomic war—although personally he could not contemplate such an undertaking with any pleasure. In a speech before the American-Scandinavian Foundation in October, he declared the atomic bomb unsuitable for the preservation of international order because of its excessive destructiveness (since remedied by the development of small bombs almost as humane as TNT); criticized the idea of preventive war against Russia because we didn't have the bases (in a few years we had them); pointed out that all Europe would be occupied by the Russians as soon as such a war began (still possible), that a prerequisite of such a war would be the effective destruction of the democratic institutions of the United States (a

good start has been made) with concentration camps to silence "a very determined minority" (the camps are ready). Freedom, he said, "thrives only in the soil and air of peace and security," and he called for world government in place of the "anarchy of war."

Against a background of increasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, Urey withdrew in November, 1946, from the Independent Citizens Committee, saying that since it purported to be an independent committee, it should "stand by itself and not submerge itself in the activities of other groups." In more respectable company he continued to support good causes; in particular, he defended Dr. Edward U. Condon, then head of the Bureau of Standards, who was being manhandled by the House Un-American Activities Committee under the chairmanship of J. Parnell Thomas. Urey accused the Committee of "character assassination by innuendo" and "irresponsible smears that may ruin [scientists in government employ] professionally for life."

In 1949, he was subjected to a bit of smearing himself. At the spy trial of Judith Coplon, a report was read from the FBI's "Confidential Informant ED 324" who in December, 1945, had advised the Bureau of the contents of a throwaway advertising the Madison Square Garden meeting at which Urey had spoken, in the company of such oddly assorted reds as Henry A. Wallace, Julian Huxley, Jo Davidson, Dr. Harlow Shapley, Senator Charles W. Tobey, Frederic March, Helen Keller, Col. Evans Carlson, Orson Welles, and Danny Kaye.

Urey's is a familiar name among the educated of all classes and his influence is great, the more so because of his broadly humanitarian and liberal outlook. Strongest of all, as would be expected, is his influence among scientists. Einstein is revered, but he is a "foreigner," almost two generations removed from the younger men, and an extremely abstract thinker in physics; while Urey is native and, as nuclear researchers go, pretty much down to earth. Consequently when, in January, 1950, Urey came out for the development of the hydrogen bomb in page-one headlines all over the country, the misgivings of many were allayed. In subsequent testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, he warned against Russian atomic bombs which might be exploded in the holds of ships in American harbors or those of our allies. That too got big headlines. Regarding the hydrogen bomb, he said that if war came we should have to win it, although to be sure, he added wryly, we might not win much. He confessed that, looking at the history of weapons, he could get "exceedingly discouraged." At one point he expressed the hope that the H-bomb would not work, or be too large for practical use. He was shocked by Klaus Fuchs' atomic spying.

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From then on, his pronouncements on atomic policy and other public questions became scarcely distinguishable from those of less scholarly battlers in the verbal war against Communism. In January, 1951, he proclaimed his belief that "fear of the atomic bomb is the only thing that is preventing and does now prevent the Soviets from crossing Western Europe. . . . I think we should say that we will send the bombs to Moscow just as soon as the Russian army makes a false move in Europe." He devoted much of his time to the Atlantic Union Community, an organization advocating political union of the Western democracies, and, in the opposite direction, to the measurement of paleotemperatures.

George Washington hanged John André, a British officer caught in disguise behind the American lines, only with reluctance. A hundred and seventy years later, the British gave light sentences to Nunn May and Fuchs, efficient and successful atomic spies. It remained for the freedom-loving Americans to put to death two American civilians, man and wife, for a crime committed (if indeed it was committed) on behalf of an ally whose casualties in the common cause were twenty to forty times those of the United States.

The Rosenbergs were sentenced to death by Judge Irving R. Kaufman on April 5, 1951. In December, 1952, reports began to circulate that Urey had written to the *New York Times* expressing doubts as to their guilt. After Urey had confirmed these reports, his letter was published by the *Times* on January 8, 1953. On January 13, Einstein appealed to President Truman for clemency, saying that his action was "prompted by the same reasons which were set forth so convincingly by my distinguished colleague, Harold C. Urey." Neither Truman nor Eisenhower paid any attention to the remonstrances of Einstein and Urey, a pair of aberrant longhairs, who, although they had done a good deal for the atomic bomb, between them couldn't collect enough votes to be elected dog warden of an incorporated village.

Urey's line in the Rosenberg case was entirely consistent with his anti-Communist, western-liberal position. In his letter to the *Times* he said, "We are engaged in a cold war with the tyrannical government of the USSR. We wish to win the approval and loyalty of the good people of the world. Would it not be embarrassing if, after the execution of the Rosenbergs, it could be shown that the United States had executed two innocent people and let a guilty one [Ruth Greenglass] go completely free?"

Despite this display of orthodoxy, he was ignored and shoved around as if he had been a red himself. Kaufman called him "presumptuous." Brownell refused him an audience; so did Eisenhower.

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The press and radio gave him an absolute minimum of attention. An example is the exchange between Urey and the *New York Times* reporter at the June 8 hearing, at which Judge Kaufman denied an application for a new trial. During a recess the *Times* man asked Urey for his comments. Urey said, in typically blunt Urey diction:

Before I came here today, I merely had grave doubts about the conduct of the trial. Now that I've seen what goes on in Judge Kaufman's courtroom, I believe the Rosenbergs are innocent.

When I look into that courtroom I see no Kaufman, but McCarthy. I'm angry and alarmed at the terrible fear and hysteria that's sweeping all over America.

What appalls me most is the role the press is playing. The judge's bias is so obvious. I keep looking over at you newspapermen and there's not a flicker of indignation or concern. When are you going to stop acting like a bunch of scared sheep?

The *Times* man asked how Urey would like it if the newspapermen tried to tell him how to run *his* business. Urey replied:

Sometimes we scientists make mistakes. So do judges and newspapermen. I've made stupid errors at times and when I do you have a perfect right to criticize them. . . . Why, what I saw in that courtroom today was worse than anything I've ever read about what the Russian courts are supposed to be like.

Not a word of this colloquy, which is taken from the *National Guardian* for July 6, 1953, appeared in the *Times*. The report merely noted that Dr. Harold C. Urey, noted atomic scientist, was present at the hearing.

After Urey appealed to Eisenhower, he was called before the McCarthy Committee in private session. The only other announced witness was an ex-professor of chemistry who had lost his job because of alleged Communist associations and has been dragged before one investigating tribunal after another since the end of World War II. The juxtaposition could, of course, have been accidental.

Following the execution of the Rosenbergs, Brownell made a speech in which he used substantially the same arguments in reference to scientists and the law as the *Times* reporter had used in defending his own profession. American folklore supplies two myths concerning scientists which, being mutually contradictory, serve all possible journalistic and political purposes. The myth of scientific omniscience and infallibility, symbolized by the man in a laboratory coat gazing intently at a test tube, is an indispensable tool of the advertising profession. The myth of scientific naïveté, which holds that eggheads can't be trusted to tie their own shoelaces, is brought into play whenever

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a scientist says anything displeasing to the high financial and executive commanders. When he makes war on the Russians Urey receives the first treatment; in the Rosenberg case he got a taste of the second.

A society's evaluation of itself is never accepted at face value abroad, even by its friends, nor by the enlightened at home. If Urey wants to appraise the kind of society he is living in, of which he has been a pillar all these years, let him compare the publicity he got when he was campaigning for the hydrogen bomb with that which he got when he asked for commutation of the Rosenberg sentences. He can be sure of his facts; it all happened to him. He cannot be equally sure of the misdemeanors of the Russians, reported to him by the same media which in the Rosenberg case treated him like some species of crank. How does he know, for instance, that that "false move" at which he was ready to bomb Moscow in 1951, would be more dependably reported than the facts of the Rosenberg case were reported to the ordinary American in 1953?

Urey would like to be a conventional patriot, but his country won't let him. Nor is the United States, already at such variance with his ideals, going to remain as it is. It is sinking into fascism. Fascism, of course, in the American style and manner—fascism, as Huey Long predicted, in the guise of Americanism. In plumping for the hydrogen bomb Urey argued that death is better than slavery. So it is, but slavery may more easily be imposed on America by Americans than by foreigners.

Looking back over the past few years, one sees a record of opposition to this trend by Communists, assorted leftists, liberal intellectuals, and so on, with results more meager than might have been expected. The reasons are complex, but one which stands out is that intellectuals like Urey, who is brave, and many who are not, have been all too ready to make common cause with demagogues and militarists in whooping it up against the Russians and the Communists at home. Do the intellectuals have to be better capitalists than Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the board of the National Steel Corporation? If this well-informed, well-connected Republican millionaire can afford to advocate immediate, unconditional negotiation "in a spirit of give and take" with the Soviet Union, is it necessary any longer to fulminate against the Russians as Urey has been doing for the past six years?

As for the related problem of Communism at home, it is high time that our intellectuals should realize that you can't beat a demagogue at his own game. Agree with him that Communism must be extirpated and he has you. The only tenable ground is that Com-

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munism and capitalism must co-exist, even in the United States: that a Communist has a right to live and express his views (although with much smaller circulation) just as a capitalist has. The fact that reciprocal freedoms do not exist in the USSR is too bad, but the USSR is not a capitalist democracy. We are, or were. If the Christian crusader looks like a Saracen, talks like a Saracen, and acts like a Saracen, he might as well be a Saracen.

Even in defending the Rosenbergs, Urey said he regards Communists and Communist sympathizers as "unreliable." Would he, then, defend the right of a Communist to teach, subject to the same qualifications of decorum, competence, and objectivity as a non-Communist? Judging by what he said about the Rosenbergs, he would not. But then, on this particular question, he is even less liberal than was Senator Taft.

The organizations of the Left have not always been run with competence commensurate with their good intentions, one reason being that the most able people usually don't like to work for low salaries and don't like to stick their necks out. Urey may have suffered from this deficiency at times, and perhaps there were misunderstandings caused by the honest faith in socialism or Communism of some of the people he may have had contacts with, while he retained and no doubt still retains an equally honest faith in capitalism. In all such situations there have been mistakes and stupidities on both sides. But if there is to be any rapprochement—and there had better be before McCarthy swallows Communists and progressive capitalists alike—the first requisite is for the Left to recognize that men like Urey have valid as well as invalid reasons for their resistance to radical change.

"A scientist can work best," Urey has said, "only when he is free to follow up what interests him. No dictator knows enough to tell scientists what to do." An appreciable number of American Communists (including many who are Communists no longer) have given every indication that if matters were in their charge they would be as tyrannical as those who are now persecuting them. The Left is suffering for its achievements as well as its errors—but that was one of its errors, nor can we be sure, as yet, that it has been corrected.

The 1946 break became unavoidable when Urey swallowed the Truman Doctrine whole. If he is now in favor of "liberation" or expects, like golfer Eisenhower, to see the "Soviet empire" obligingly break up, any collaboration between him and the Left had best follow the pattern of the Rosenberg case. But even in 1946 the breach might have been more amicable, and more easily healed, if many leaders of the Left had not so often substituted Marxist rote for

Marxist analysis, *Pravda* for their own brains, and vituperation for rational argument.

Nor is all that in the past. As recently as January, 1953, Urey (with Einstein) was condemning anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. Their press release was no masterpiece of objectivity; it remained for Joshua Kunitz, a leftist, to tell something approaching the real story in his *Monthly Review* article (and subsequently pamphlet) "The Jewish Problem in the USSR." But all the same in the case of the Moscow doctors, Urey and Einstein were closer to the truth than the Soviet apologists who assumed the doctors must be guilty merely because some faction in Moscow had accused them. These hogtied journalists should memorize, with a slight addition, Cromwell's saying: "I beseech you, brethren, that you pray God to show you that it is possible for you [and the Soviet Union] to be mistaken."

I have seen Urey only a few times and have never exchanged a word with him. Why then, for almost twenty years, have I felt something akin to personal disappointment whenever he turned categorically against the Left, and been heartened whenever he reappeared on its side? One reason is that I am a scientist myself—a disoriented one. I gave up a technical vocation in mid-career because, among the many satisfactions it yielded, it failed in the one I wanted most. I think Urey wants much the same thing, that therefore he belongs on the Left. When he turns against it, even with the best of excuses, he stultifies himself. But the Left must show him concretely that he belongs to it, and it to him. This may not be possible. Or it may.

There are several million intelligent, patriotic, socially conscious people in this country who in 1956 might hold the balance of power between a Presidential candidate who still believes in capitalist democracy and civil liberties, and some fascist or forerunner of fascism who has discarded all that nonsense. Urey, a kind of scientific Harold L. Ickes—though lacking Ickes' verbal brilliance and political savvy—is a potential leader of such a group. If he should embark on any such enterprise, he might not like some of the company. But he needs the support and counsel of the Left, as it needs him. The situation is not one in which we are free to choose our allies on the basis of congeniality and pleasant manners. The Rosenbergs are dead. Their tragedy has only such meaning as the living choose to give it. Let Urey reflect on the demands both the living and the dead make on his conscience. Others in the same moral position have the same obligation.

THE SITUATION IN BRITAIN:

A COMMUNICATION

BY AN ENGLISH CORRESPONDENT

The two discussions of the Margate Conference and of the present alignments within the Labor Party, by A British Socialist and Scott Nearing, in the November issue must have given MR readers an essentially false impression which cannot be allowed to go unchallenged.

Both authors believe that as a result of Margate, Labor is now committed to a wide extension of nationalization. This is simply not the case. The only *new* industry *Challenge to Britain* proposes to nationalize is waterworks, hardly a commanding height of the British economy. And, as Scott Nearing pointed out, land nationalization—with which the Liberal party flirted over forty years ago—was rejected by a more than two-to-one majority. Moreover, detailed and reasoned schemes for nationalizing key sectors of heavy industry, prepared by directly interested trade unions, were turned down in favor of meaningless public ownership of pilot plants. So far, nationalization has largely played the role of Good Samaritan to shareholders in such industries as coal and railroads, left derelict by private enterprise.* The quest for the floating voter, accepted by both your contributors as a valid rationalization of *Challenge to Britain's* conservatism, has left the Labor Party with a milk-and-water brand of socialism without the milk. Nor did either author comment on the fact that the Margate program is the first in Labor history which calls for *fixing* working class living standards at *past* highest levels and explicitly rules out attempts to raise these admittedly low maxima by concerted political action.

Much of the current talk of the need for "a shift in the pattern of ownership of capital" is too vague to have much programmatic value and emanates from Gaitskell and other right-wingers who sincerely fear the "disincentive" effects on the capitalists of proposals

* Cf. Brady's judgment that "state ownership has not altered the general structure of the ownership of securities, or of income claims on the community's real resources, except, possibly, somewhat to improve the status of the rentier." *Crisis in Britain*, p. 659.

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to reduce the unequal distribution of income. One of the major functions of the Welfare State socialism of 1945-1951 was to provide a cushion for the middle class against the economic and social impact of the war and of the decay of British imperialism. Yet, apart from minor tinkering and proposed repairs to make good Tory retreats, *Challenge to Britain* accepts the edifice of the Welfare State as more or less complete. It is therefore difficult to understand A British Socialist's conclusion that "there is more than enough [in the Margate platform] to keep any Labor Government busy." Nor does he mention the official Labor acceptance of the productivity ballyhoo sponsored by various American Missions and by British Big Business. The philosophy of *Challenge to Britain*, no less than of the productivity teams, is no increases in working class shares in the national income without at least proportionate increases in labor productivity.

The truth is that *Challenge to Britain* is the cul de sac of Welfare State socialism. Unless it is abandoned, the logical next step, in the not unlikely event of an economic downswing, is a retreat to supporting reductions in living standards and devious attempts to repeat the fiasco of 1931.

Two or three other points. First, A British Socialist says that Margate marks the end of the Bevanite controversy. This statement has already been belied by the Labor Executive's sharp reprimand to Ian Mikardo for appearing on the same platform with the pariah Dr. Jagan, and to *Tribune* for daring to attack the TUC's condemnation of the British Guiana People's Progressive Party. The patched-up paper compromise of Margate is at best a temporary truce which is already being worn away at the edges and which will not be able to bear the strain of the gathering economic tensions.

Second, Scott Nearing specifically called attention to the absence of redbaiting at the Margate Conference. Perhaps by McCarthy standards he has a point. But since when should McCarthy serve as a criterion for judging Tory, let alone Labor, politicians? Scott Nearing should read the *Daily Herald* regularly for a while before giving Transport House a blanket testimonial. He should recall the classic definition of a democracy propounded by Christopher Mayhew, M.P., ex-Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as any country which is not Communist. McCarthy himself could not improve on this, letting in as it does Franco Spain, Syngman Rhee South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek Formosa, Greece, and a whole host of dictatorships in Latin America and the Middle East, and excluding such non-Communist governments as those of Guatemala and British Guiana before the forcible suspension of its constitution. He should study the growing list of excommunications of Labor Party veterans for their support of proscribed organizations ("guilt by association") which contrasts

sharply with the toleration of adherents of Moral Rearmament (such as Sam Watson, the Durham miners' leader, who is a member of both the Labor Party Executive and the TUC).

Third and most important, while there is some ground for objecting to the title of A British Socialist's article ("The British Labor Party Prepares for Power"), it is his concluding paragraph which is perhaps most misleading. The only prospect he leaves for left Socialists for the time being is settling down to "basic socialist education and propaganda" and "working out what they themselves mean by socialism in contemporary British conditions." He thus ignores or, perhaps more accurately, fails to anticipate the ferment within the trade unions which is the most striking and most promising internal development for a long time. This tremendous upsurge, which is largely of an orthodox pork-chop character, is already threatening to put an end to all the nicely balanced formulas of Margate and is bound to effect the alignment of forces in both the political and industrial arms of the labor movement. The Tory government has carried through big cuts in working class real income by slashing the food subsidies and social benefits and by relaxing or abandoning various controls; and it is now pushing for the elimination of what is left of the subsidies and of the apparatus of commodity controls as well as for a rent "reform" program involving substantial increases in working-class rents. In the last two years, retail prices have risen more than money wages and much more than scales of benefit.

More and more trade unions have begun vigorously to defend themselves against these direct onslaughts on living standards. The railroad workers, among the worst paid in Britain, have won a small concession (a raise of 56 cents a week) without recourse to the time-consuming formalities of arbitration by threatening to strike a week before Christmas, and other transport workers have also obtained raises. The miners are actively pressing an old wage claim. A conference of officials of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, embracing three and a half million workers, barely defeated a rank-and-file proposal to stop overtime and piece-rate work in reply to the employers' contemptuous rejection of a demand for a 15 percent wage increase; and while the issue is pending before a court of arbitration, the whole situation is highly explosive.

The Tory Government is faced with a mighty trade-union campaign for higher wages to match the increase in the cost of living, a campaign which the traditional tactics of delay followed by trivial concessions can no longer fob off. As the government is not strong enough *by itself* to repeat the head-on collisions of 1926 and 1931, the attitude of the political wing of the labor movement is going to be decisive. If Labor adopts the Morrison-Deakin line of restraint, for

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which there is the less excuse in view of the abandonment of dividend restraints and the orgy of bonus share issues in the City, the trends towards a polarization of Left and Right will be intensified and the latter's ability to tame the local party branches and the trade-union militants seriously impaired. More probably, something half way between restraint and concerted strike action will prevail. But in any case the days of trimming and behind-the-scenes settlement of inner party conflicts are drawing to a close, and the more acute the American recession and the greater its impact on Britain, the more acute will these conflicts inevitably become. This, then, is hardly the occasion for left socialist withdrawal to basic education and speculation, than which nothing could better suit the books of the Right or for that matter of the Tories. Counsels of propaganda for long-term goals, plus inertia tempered by cogitation in the present, could not be more untimely.

The world situation reinforces this conclusion. By and large and with few exceptions, the Parliamentary Labor Party has acted as a tail to the Churchillian kite, and, though the hour is singularly propitious, has failed to capture the initiative Churchill seized in his May 11 speech, only to surrender under pressure from Eisenhower and Dulles and to a lesser extent from Butler and Salisbury. The Anglo-American alliance is still the fixed point of British strategy on which, with differences of nuance, both parties are agreed. Similarly, since the movement for expanding East-West trade and particularly trade with China is bipartisan and has now been endorsed even by the Federation of British Industries, there is room here only for minor inter-party tactical maneuvering. It is universally accepted that, barring a resumption of Korean hostilities which no one expects and everyone opposes, there will be a major, though possibly gradual, relaxation of existing restrictions on trade. The anticipated decline in sterling-area exports to the dollar area makes this inevitable despite McCarthy's fulminations and Foreign Office and Board of Trade timidity—already in December Russian sales of gold to the Bank of England contributed more than American aid to foreign exchange reserves.

The big issues remain, first, the whole question of relations with the Soviet bloc and, more specifically, the abortive Churchill attempt at a *détente*, the role of Germany, and future policy towards China; and second, the colonial problem. There is a magnificent opportunity for a popular campaign to transform what James Reston calls the cold peace into a warm if not a durable one, a campaign which, because American capitalism cannot afford to get too out of step with its allies, would almost certainly have positive repercussions on the *internal* situation in the United States. There are significant differ-

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ences between Left and Right in the Labor party on this issue, turning precisely on whether and how far the Anglo-American coalition should constitute the unchanging basis of British policy. But American socialists particularly should remember that what sometimes emerges as opposition to the American alignment is often and to a varying extent the reflection of Anglo-American imperialist antagonisms and of malicious pleasure over Wall Street's bellyaches in digesting the leadership of the Holy Alliance and the White Man's Burden so reluctantly relinquished by British imperialism. The Right seems to be content for the moment with serving chiefly as a ginger group to the Conservative government on the question of a détente, with the Left in its turn serving as a ginger group to the Right. These cleavages over the acceptance of American hegemony and on German rearmament are the more likely to find vocal expression because Labor is in opposition and not in office.

The party has conditionally endorsed Chinese admission into the UN, but there is no doubt that the Left is more committed than the Right in this respect. The growth of pro-Chinese sentiment here is unmistakable and it would be a great pity if the party as a whole and the left socialists in particular failed to capitalize on and reinforce this feeling. Colonial policy still attracts far less notice than it deserves, and although a group of MPs, led by Fenner Brockway and Leslie Hale, are trying to undo some of the damage caused by Front Bench acquiescence in the most shameful Tory measures of repression in Guiana, Kenya, and Malaya (see Scott Nearing's World Events in the December MR), there is a lot of leeway to make up before we can claim to have acquitted ourselves with a modicum of honor.

In conclusion, it is necessary to underline the fact that current industrial developments are among the most exciting for many years. While they will certainly interact with foreign policy, it is perhaps premature to hope for any big change in the latter until the American economic situation crystallizes.

Too long have men of good will been timid and hesitant. Too long have we been bullied, bluffed and confused by those who would destroy but who will not build. It is time now—it has long been time—for men of good will to embrace their responsibilities, to speak out, to dare to be different, and to use their capacities for working together in behalf of peoples everywhere.

—Murray D. Lincoln, President of the
Cooperative League of the United States

"ANTI-AMERICANISM" IN EUROPE

BY ALEX COMFORT

This is an extract from an article which was originally written for the special Civil Liberties issue of *The Nation* (December 12, 1953) but which had to be left out for space reasons. It is published here with the permission of the author and the editors of *The Nation*.

The quality of the "anti-Americanism" which the author analyzes was vividly indicated in a recent letter from one of our English subscribers. "How one longs," he wrote, "to *praise* America for a change and say, 'I told you so, this was only a temporary madness!'"

Alex Comfort is a biologist and novelist who says of himself that he is an "exponent of a form of anarchism based on modern social anthropology." He is the author of five books, including three novels. His work entitled *Sexual Behavior in Society* was published in this country by Viking Press.—THE EDITORS

There is no more "anti-Americanism" in Europe than during the war—than there is normally friction at the fringes of cultures. Not, that is, the type of "tension" which sociology studies, and which arises from misunderstanding, leads to a stereotype hatred of all Americans, or wants to see Americans in trouble.

This is an important fact, because some enlightened professional crusaders, Communist and anti-Communist, have claimed merit for hating policies without hating peoples: the "anti-Americanism" of Europe is predominantly in this category. It is discriminate. It does not hate you, but the people you accept as your policymakers. It particularly dislikes the cruelty, irresponsibility, and truculence of one or two of the military gentlemen whose utterances have been reported, perhaps selectively, and whose actions have disgusted millions.

Every nation, as we know, conjures up an echo-word in the mind of another. France, for the Englishman, evokes either the echo "culture" or the echo "sex," according to his social group. Russia, I would say, has the echo "secrecy." England's echo in the United States ranges from "tradition" to "duplicity." In the last two years, the echo attached to America in Europe has changed. It used to be "push" or "bigness." Now, for almost the whole of Europe, the echo is "war."

That echo was not created by the Communists. For years, they plastered Europe with posters which asserted it to be so, but unsuccessfully. Now the *levée-en-masse* of public feeling which they hoped to obtain has come, on its own, not under their control. Its authors

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have not been Stalin, or even Malenkov, but MacArthur, McCarthy, Dulles, and General Ridgway. It does not spring from the belief that Russia may be emerging from a period of irrational autocracy, while America is entering one in her own different way, though that belief is very widespread. It springs quite simply from the answer which Europe seems to hear to its one and only question: "Do you *want* to end the cold war, or do you not?"

Europe puts that question to America, not Russia, because America is on "Our Side," and a distrusted ally in a dominant position is more disquieting than the most implacable adversary. And from Korea, Indo-China, Germany, Japan, and every other country where the finger of the Dulles policy has fallen, it seems to hear an answer which it has always feared, and which it will never accept.

The Soviet Union has become a moral yardstick by which we evaluate our national deeds and virtues. We must commit no deed, large or small or good or bad, without first measuring it to the Soviet pattern. And if, in making our daily genuflections toward the Kremlin, its towers are obscured by fog, we are paralyzed. We cannot move at all until the weather clears.

—Dalton Trumbo

Do men boast now—as they did during the dramatic events of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—of their individuality, of free thinking, of a determination to stand up against authority should it become tyrannical? Are we afraid not only of our Robin Hoods but also of our Franklins and Jeffersons, our Priestleys and Lincolns?

The mind that closes itself to political freedom will be found closed toward the intellectual processes that in any decent culture must flourish without stint and without restraint.

Freedom is indivisible, to invade it at one place is to degrade it everywhere.

—George D. Stoddard, former President, University of Illinois,
New York Times, November 23, 1953

THE OMINOUS PARALLEL

BY MARTIN HALL

There is an ominous parallel in the present political development in America with that of the dying days of the German Republic just before Hitler came to power. The degeneration of the American democratic system in our day shows far too many uncomfortable similarities with the same process which took place in Germany in 1932. While there are differences, of course, as we will point out, these differences are for the most part only differences of degree. In both cases, democracy was failing because the economic system on which it was based was faced with growing difficulties, and fascism attracted the support of the ruling class as the only way to insure at least temporary survival to the system. In both cases, a deep crisis of leadership precipitated the trend towards a fascist dictatorship.

At this critical moment, a political vacuum has been created in the executive branch of the government. The White House, for all practical purposes, is empty, just as was the Presidential Palais in Berlin in the last months of 1932.

The same deadly combination of Big Business and the military which put a general, built up into a synthetic national hero, at the helm of the German Republic in the person of Field Marshal von Hindenburg, backed another general, Eisenhower, for the White House. But in both cases the President-General was challenged in his national leadership by a demagogic fascist leader ready and willing to fill the political vacuum created by the lack of will and capacity of the President to assert his leadership in the face of the challenge.

This is the classic setting of an immediate pre-fascist period. Indeed, the parallel is ominous.

To be sure, there are differences. Germany's economic crisis at the end of 1932 was certainly much more advanced than the crisis of our economy today, which is just feeling the first tremors of an impending depression. As a result, public confidence in the workability of our economic system is still high, while in the Germany of 1932 it had all but vanished.

Another difference, and perhaps a crucial one, lies in the fact that Hitler had one great advantage over the leaders of American

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fascism today. That advantage is that the leaders of German fascism could count on the unstinting support of the rest of the capitalist world for the promised crusade against the Soviet Union. World War II has changed the world picture completely. Not only has socialism in one form or another been adopted by more than a third of the world's population, but the allies of the United States today are definitely opposed to and afraid of the rise of fascism in this country, for they know that its final consequence would be another world war started by the American war party. This they must oppose at all costs in the interest of their own survival. If the rulers of Germany in 1932 could bank on strengthening their alliances abroad through their support of Hitler, the ruling class of America today would face a complete collapse of its system of foreign alliances if McCarthyism should ultimately triumph.

In this country, there is still alive a democratic tradition opposed to and suspicious of the powers of an over-centralized government—a tradition that Germany lacked. On the other hand, German labor, even though tragically divided into two factions fighting each other, had grown up in the tradition of Marxism, of a class consciousness which still seems alien to most of American labor with its Gompers' tradition of the usefulness of cooperation between labor and capital.

But, as in Germany in 1932, so today in America: reaction has steadily advanced in a drive to undermine the democratic principles of the Constitution. The Weimar Constitution of the German Republic was on paper one of the most advanced documents in political democracy, combining the essential features of the French as well as the English Revolutions. But by a deliberate process of chiseling away at its foundations, this political structure was weakened more and more, just as reaction in America since the beginning of the cold war has been successful in the same endeavor.

No single political figure in pre-Hitler Germany had more to do with this deliberate process than the Papal Nuncio in Berlin, Cardinal Pacelli, the present Pope, who directed in every detail the policies of the last two German Chancellors before Hitler, the Roman Catholic politicians Bruening and von Papen. Both used increasingly in the years before 1933 the loophole in the Weimar Constitution, the famous Article 48, which allowed government by decree rather than by parliament in cases of "national emergency." At a time when Cardinal Spellman, the top spokesman for the Roman Catholic hierarchy in this country, has come out in open defense of Senator McCarthy, as he did recently in a speech in Brussels, at a time when the influence of Vatican power politics is steadily growing in Washington, the parallel becomes obvious.

There are other parallels. Just as Brownell, as spokesman for the administration, and McCarthy, as the number one fascist demagogue, are competing today in trying to destroy what remains of the popular memory of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations by picturing their policies as "treason" and betrayal of American interests to Russia, so were the spokesmen for the early Weimar Republic smeared as responsible for Germany's defeat in World War I, as agents of the "enemies" and "lackeys of the Allies" carrying out the provisions of the "shame of Versailles."

Fascist forerunners of the Nazis, the "Feme" assassins liquidated in the earlier years of the Weimar Republic such democratic leaders as Erzberger and Rathenau. In the last days of the Weimar Republic, Hitler's brown shirts started a reign of physical terror that challenged law and order. Time and time again, the Nazi murderers of labor leaders were acquitted by German courts. The parallel with our own courts' collaborating in the systematic destruction of the Bill of Rights and lending their authority to political persecution of nonconformists, displays essentially the same aspect of a decaying society.

Then, as now, it became imperative in the face of growing worries and anxieties to divert the people's attention from those responsible for their plight. A scapegoat had to be found. What in our days has become—to quote the words of Professor H. H. Wilson in a recent article in the *Nation*—the "greatest hoax in our history, the myth of a Communist conspiracy," corresponds with the Nazi slogan of the "Jewish usurers" who allegedly kept the German people in bondage. It did not make any difference then that not more than one percent of Germany's population were Jews and that only a small minority of them had anything to do with the banks. It does not matter now that in percentage of population figures this country, of all major countries of the world, has the smallest and least influential Communist Party.

Then, as now, a general was put into the presidency. Marshal von Hindenburg, a senile old man who had never in his life read a book except one dealing with military subjects, was utterly incapable of grasping the trend of events. Like Eisenhower, he shrank from becoming involved in the dirty game of politics. Isolated from real life by a group of shrewdly manipulating advisers, he became more and more remote from the problems of the nation. Frustrated and without leadership, Germany was crying out for a strong man. He arose in the person of a once obscure Austrian house painter, Adolph Schickelgruber, alias Hitler.

Hitler's methods and his appeal were in many respects like those of the Senator from Wisconsin. It was an appeal to the mob instincts. A fanatical nationalist who blended his exhortations to patriotism

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with a highly effective social demagoguery which rested on the growing belief that capitalism was done for, Hitler sold his recipe under the false slogan of "socialism" while, in reality, his was a desperate attempt to save the very system he seemed to attack.

The point should be kept in mind here that the weakness of our American fascists lies precisely in the fact that they have not yet found the equal to that demagogic weapon of Hitler. One of the reasons might be that our economic crisis is only beginning. The financial backers of McCarthy would have a hard time swallowing even a phony "anticapitalist" propaganda on the part of their new hero. But that does not mean that, once depression really hits this country, a McCarthy might not be perfectly able to find a similar demagogic approach. The man who came closest to becoming a fascist dictator in this country, Huey Long, is proof that this kind of fascist social demagoguery can grow in American soil just as it did in Germany and Italy.

American fascism today may, as a matter of fact, have already begun to realize this weakness. On December 4, 1953, Father Coughlin, the Detroit radio priest who was silenced by the Catholic Church 14 years ago for being too openly fascist, re-appeared on the scene. In a speech before 1,100 Catholic laymen, he came out for the present CIO demand for a guaranteed annual wage as "the first step in flourishing the sword of the spirit to combat communism."

Nor should we be deceived by a setback in the fortunes of a McCarthy, if it should occur. It might be temporary. The last three months of the Weimar Republic saw such a development. In November, 1932, in the last free elections in Germany, it looked as if the phenomenal rise of Nazi votes might be reversed. The Nazi Party lost a cool million in that election and found itself broke. It was then that the evil spirit of Roman Catholic power politics, Franz von Papen, went into action. It was he who arranged the first face-to-face meeting of Hitler with the coal and steel barons of the Ruhr. In no time, the Nazi Party was again flush with money. The real masters of Germany had decided to cast their lot with Hitler.

When a new cabinet crisis arose, Hitler was ready. In classical blackmail fashion, he confronted the senile President Hindenburg with evidence of a corruption scandal involving misuse of state funds by a number of Prussian Junkers who had tried to finance their broken estates with taxpayers' money. Involved were not only some of Hindenburg's closest friends, but also his son, Major von Hindenburg. Hitler's terms were blunt. Either Hindenburg would appoint him Chancellor or within twenty-four hours the Nazi press would reveal the scandal. Hindenburg gave in. Hitler had reached his goal. Within weeks, Goering had arranged for the Reichstag fire which was

promptly blamed on the Communists, who were outlawed. The Social Democrats and the unions followed. One after another, the political parties were dissolved or dissolved themselves. One-party rule was established.

President Hindenburg and his advisers were as repulsed by the crude methods of the uncouth "upstart" Hitler as Eisenhower may be by the antics of Senator McCarthy. But without the ability and the will to exercise leadership, Hindenburg was too weak to resist the crude blackmail of the Nazi leaders. In the same pattern, Ike has given in time and again to McCarthy.

McCarthy is quite logical in his most recent attacks on Dulles, and indirectly on Eisenhower. If the New and Fair Deals are to be declared treason, then both men are fair targets. After all, Dulles was one of Truman's closest advisors on foreign affairs; and Eisenhower was appointed wartime commander of allied forces in Europe by Roosevelt and, in this capacity, played an important role in the outcome of the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences.

Will McCarthy be able to do to Eisenhower what Hitler did to Hindenburg? Will he be able to convince the men of Big Business in the East, as he already has convinced the Texas oil millionaires, that he, and not the weak man in the White House, deserves their full support?

The next few months may be decisive. If Eisenhower allows Congress to bind his hands in foreign policy through the Bricker Amendment; if he lets Taft's successor, Senator Knowland (who already has openly sided with McCarthy against him), achieve his goals in the Far East; if he signs bills like the anti-labor Butler Bill (if it should pass), he and his party stand to lose in the November elections, if they run "on the Republican record." McCarthy knows that better than anybody else, and it is why he wants "Communism in government" to be the only issue. If the President allows McCarthy to have his way, he himself will be among the next victims of what a leading French paper, commenting on the Harry Dexter White case, called "political cannibalism."

This is not to say that all is lost. But it means that more is needed than a defeat of the Republicans in 1954 and 1956. What is needed is the development of leadership for a truly alternative policy, alternative to both the Republican and the Truman policies. That policy must be based on restoration of political freedom at home, and on what Franklin D. Roosevelt in his last undelivered speech called the "art of human relations" in foreign policy. It must be a policy of plenty for all, of a cooperative rather than a profit economy. Moreover, only a new leadership, based on a militant coalition of

labor and farmers, can find the necessary courage to deliver the country from its hysterical fear of Communism.

Only in this way can we avoid the double, and in this atomic age fatal, tragedy of war and fascism which would make the parallel with German history complete.

THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A MODEST PROPOSAL

BY AN ECONOMIST

Nearly everyone agrees that an expansion of international trade is desirable. On the one hand, liberals and many conservatives view expanding trade in the "free world" as somewhat of a panacea capable of solving certain domestic marketing problems plaguing "free enterprise" economies. On the other hand, socialists frequently suggest that an expansion of East-West trade could serve as an essential foundation for peace and coexistence. Still, with the notable exception of a flourishing intra-socialist bloc trade, international trade appears to be pretty much in the doldrums.

Obstacles to Expansion of World Trade

Why is this so? Can it be that either one or both of the above proposals is somewhat unrealistic? Given the existence and probable continuation of at least a cool war for some time, are there any more promising lines for developing international trade?

To answer these questions, certain unpleasant facts must be recognized at the outset:

(1) A drive to export and a reluctance to import are characteristics of all advanced capitalist economies. These pressures represent an extension to the international sphere of the growing contradictions of capitalism which stem from the fact that market problems are intensified as capitalist economies mature. This will be true

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regardless of the size of the particular domestic capitalist market or the establishment of clever international clearing devices. It is true for the United States, and it would be true for western Europe, even though by some miracle a single market could be created for this area.* Frequent platitudinous statements to the effect that "trade is a two-way street" will not help relieve this pressure one iota. This growing pressure is the main reason why advocates of expanded trade among the mature "free world" economies are doomed to disappointment. Instead of an expansion of "free world" trade, all signs point towards a chaotic era of competitive devaluation, import quotas, and attempted dumping of "surplus" products on the world market.

(2) The extension of long-term credit abroad by advanced capitalist economies would of course tend to reduce the above-mentioned pressure. This is because the lending countries need not immediately import commodities to balance current exports flowing from these extensions of credit. (Eventually, of course, when and if the loans are ever repaid, commodities must be imported.) Unfortunately, however, the amount of long-term credit to be extended by advanced capitalist economies would seem to be limited on all sides: (a) by political "instability" in nonsocialist underdeveloped countries; (b) by political myopia with regard to the socialist world; and (c) by the fact that the more mature capitalist countries already have all the capital they can use. Thus, the sophisticated Keynesians who advance this "solution" will also be disappointed.

(3) In the absence of long-term credits extended by the advanced capitalist economies, exports of goods must be more or less balanced either by current imports of goods or services, or by gold shipments. Imports of sufficient commodities to balance exports is out of the question because of the growing market problem—our first basic fact mentioned above. The flow of gold on the international market is of very limited importance. Furthermore, as far as the United States is concerned the low official price for gold discourages the movement of gold here to fill the chronic gap between our exports and imports.

It follows that advocates of greater East-West trade may also be disappointed even if western Europe should decide to follow an independent course of action with respect to trading with the socialist

* It is true that this pressure was not as apparent in western Europe during the immediate postwar period. This is because much capital stock in this area had to be replaced as a consequence of the devastation resulting from World War II. Now that the capital stock has been largely rebuilt, we may expect increasing pressure for capital outlets abroad. To some extent, western European export industries may be unable to compete with more productive United States export industries. As a result, increasingly severe import restrictions will have to be imposed in an attempt to achieve a "favorable" balance of trade.

bloc. Of course, a certain amount of grain, timber, coal, petroleum, manganese, and chromium is required by western Europe from the socialist bloc. But, beyond this, there are certainly no logical grounds for assuming that the capitalist countries of western Europe would be any more able to import from the socialist bloc than they are from each other. Long-term loans to the socialist areas are ruled out by the political myopia mentioned above under our second unpleasant fact. Furthermore, as we shall see subsequently, the socialist bloc has comparatively little to offer the West at attractive prices.

Despite these and other limitations on the development of East-West trade, a more encouraging possible answer to the problem of expanding world trade suggests itself. This possibility is somewhat broader and more complicated than either of the two orthodox proposals mentioned above.

As background for explaining this possibility, I should like to suggest that the world can be divided roughly into three areas, each of which is characterized by different stages of economic development. As a result, each of these areas is also faced with different problems affecting their potentialities for expanding world trade. Therefore, I should also like to discuss the problems and potentialities of each area in some detail.

Colonial and Semi-colonial Areas

First, we have the areas where peoples desperately crave industrialization and the fruits thereof. These countries generally lie to the south of the more advanced capitalist and socialist areas, and include the Arab-Asian bloc as well as most of Africa and Latin America. Up to now these areas have served as sources of cheap raw materials for advanced industrial countries. But at present there are some significant indications that these people are no longer satisfied with "world prices," that is, capitalist market prices. They want higher prices for the raw materials they sell and lower prices for the manufactured items they must buy abroad. No longer do they want to sell their raw materials in relatively competitive markets and buy finished goods in comparatively monopolistic markets. The recent sales of Ceylonese and Burmese rubber to China, at higher-than-world prices, are impressive examples of this growing realization that the socialist world's price structure may be more favorable to the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Likewise, the Soviet Union reportedly is negotiating currently for Chilean copper and Indonesian tin at prices considerably above the "world price" for these raw materials.

Contrary to popular belief, these areas at present represent a very limited market for consumer goods. For regardless of the number

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of "five-year plans" devised by their ruling cliques, their economies are still capitalistic in nature and are therefore subject to market problems similar to—although less intense than—those plaguing all such economies today.

Of course, these areas do present a virtually unlimited market for capital investment. But here is where advanced capitalist countries must hesitate to venture. A certain amount of capital can be safely invested in transportation and mining facilities. But to build up the heavy and medium industries of these countries would mean the creation of unwanted competitors, not to mention a potentially more dangerous proletariat. Furthermore, private capitalists today correctly evaluate the political situation in these areas in terms of an "unfavorable climate for investment."

Socialist Areas

Next we have the Soviet and Soviet-influenced areas where peoples are still busy industrializing their economies at a phenomenal pace. Until fairly recently, these areas have been somewhat dependent on the more advanced industrial areas for certain capital goods, as well as on the underdeveloped areas for basic raw materials. But now the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent the areas of Soviet influence, are not as desperate for capital goods as western experts would like to think. In fact, with the exception of China, they are fully capable of exporting considerable quantities of relatively inexpensive capital equipment, particularly agricultural machinery, machine tools, and rolling stock. Likewise, their planned drive for self-sufficiency with regard to industrial raw materials has been strikingly successful.

Since relatively less emphasis has been placed here on the development of agriculture and consumer goods generally, these sectors of the socialist-oriented economies operate under conditions of low labor productivity, and hence with relatively high costs of production. On the other hand, sectors producing capital goods operate under conditions of relatively high labor productivity which give rise to low costs of production.*

Socialist areas, of course, represent an unlimited market for consumer goods. There is no market problem here since annual planned price reductions automatically create a vast new reservoir of pur-

* These are the findings of Dr. Walter Galenson, who has made a rather intensive comparison of labor productivity in the United States and in the USSR. Walter Galenson, "Industrial Labor Productivity," in A. Bergson, ed., *Soviet Economic Growth*, p. 206.

chasing power and make impossible any unwanted accumulation of consumer goods on the shelves.

This is not to say that there is no market for capital goods in the socialist areas, but only that it is comparatively limited. Standardization of capital goods production in these areas has proceeded to the point where imports of large quantities of non-standardized western producer goods might well cause more trouble than they would be worth. Non-standardized consumer goods imports present fewer technical problems, however.

Overdeveloped Capitalist Areas

Finally we come to the more familiar economies of the western bloc of highly industrialized countries. This area is very dependent on the colonial and semi-colonial bloc for industrial raw materials. These economies present a limited market for consumer goods, although they are capable of producing a virtually unlimited supply of these items. Inventories of consumer goods grow despite the fact that plants operate at well below capacity production, and consumer credit reaches new high levels. In a very real sense, these economies can be considered to be "overdeveloped."

Since western agriculture and light industries operate for the most part in a competitive market, producers of consumer goods generally are unable to emulate the more fortunate monopolistic producers of capital goods who maintain prices, reduce output, and abstain from lowering profit margins. As a consequence, western consumer goods prices are relatively low on the world market while the prices of capital goods are in many cases relatively high since they contain substantial monopoly elements.

In terms of comparative cost, the conditions in the capitalist and socialist blocs are the reverse of each other: the socialist bloc has a comparative advantage in producer goods, while the capitalist bloc has a comparative advantage in consumer goods production.

Let me now summarize the main characteristics of our three areas:—

- (1) Only one area has an unlimited market for investment goods—the colonial and semi-colonial countries.
- (2) Only one area has an unlimited market for consumer goods—the socialist area.
- (3) Only one area has the capacity for producing large quantities of consumer goods for export—the overdeveloped capitalist areas.
- (4) Two areas have the capacity for producing capital goods for export—the socialist and the western blocs. However, only one—

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the socialist bloc—seems ready and willing to do so with no strings attached. Furthermore, the capacity of the socialist bloc to export comparatively inexpensive capital goods will undoubtedly increase from year to year. In the words of Stalin, "it will soon come to pass that these [socialist] countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products." (*Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, International Publishers edition, p. 27.)

The Possibilities of "Triangular Trade"

As a consequence of these general economic characteristics of the three areas, a vast "triangular trade" becomes conceivable. Surplus, inexpensive consumer goods could flow from the western to the socialist bloc; inexpensive capital goods and technology could flow from the socialist areas to the colonial and semi-colonial world; and essential raw materials could flow from the underdeveloped areas to the advanced capitalist countries.

Obviously, this triangular trade would not *supplant* but rather *supplement* existing lines of trade. Presumably the Soviet Union will continue to export some surplus food such as grain, as well as some raw materials. At the same time, the Soviet Union undoubtedly will continue to import other strategic raw materials from the underdeveloped areas. It is naturally to be hoped that these more conventional trading patterns can also be expanded.

Neither is there any reason why the Soviet practice of concluding bilateral or trilateral agreements need be abandoned. Experience among the countries in the socialist bloc has already shown clearly that a flourishing trade can develop in this manner.

Of course, there is nothing particularly novel about the development of triangular trade as such. What is novel about this proposal is that it recognizes: (1) the ability and willingness of the Soviet Union to export capital goods to underdeveloped areas; (2) the ability and willingness of the Soviet Union to purchase substantial quantities of consumer goods from the West; and most important, (3) the new, improved bargaining position of the underdeveloped areas.

This suggested flow of goods unfortunately does not contemplate "trade among friends." Rather it is based more on the mutual interests of the parties concerned. In this respect, however, it would seem to provide at least a realistic basis for coexistence, if not outright peace.

What are the specific advantages of this suggested flow of goods to each of the areas?

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The colonial and semi-colonial world would receive capital goods for industrialization at relatively low prices. The somewhat simpler technology of socialist types of capital goods may often be more rapidly assimilated by workers in these areas also. Higher prices for the basic raw materials they have to sell would create a greater capacity for industrialization without external assistance.

The socialist bloc would maintain its high level of standardization of capital goods. Thus, it would be less dependent on outside areas for spare parts, and correspondingly less vulnerable in the event of war. The standard of living in these areas would also rise even more rapidly than it is now doing under the new Malenkov economic policy.

The western bloc would not be required to ship what it considers "strategic" material to the socialist countries. And a *deep* recession might be avoided by this international "cushion" for the consumer goods industries. (This may also be an indirect benefit to the socialist countries since a severe depression might conceivably precipitate dangerous action on the part of the capitalist countries.) The West should be advised, however, that in the future it will have to pay higher prices for raw materials, since colonial and semi-colonial areas are in a better bargaining position than ever before in history.

Recent world events tend to support the realistic nature of this three-dimensional trade proposal. As early as April, 1952, the western delegates to the International Trade Conference in Moscow reported that the Soviet representatives appeared to be rather anxious to accept consumer goods. More recently, at Vienna and at Geneva, Soviet trade representatives have again offered to purchase consumer goods from the West.

The latest trade agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and nonsocialist countries indicate that in fact the Soviets are already importing considerable quantities of consumer goods, particularly butter, wool, and meat. According to a recent Soviet report, the USSR is buying abroad this year a record-breaking \$1 billion worth of food and consumer goods. Furthermore, some significance may be attached to the report that Soviet importing agencies have recently obtained catalogs of consumer goods manufactured in this country. (Harry Schwartz in the *New York Times*, November 1, 1953.)

On the other hand, socialist capital goods exports to such countries as Argentina, Pakistan, Indonesia, and India have been increasing in scope during the past few years. China likewise is receiving and is scheduled to receive substantial quantities of capital goods from her more advanced socialist allies, although socialist technology and planning "know-how" will probably be more important in China's

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future development. The recent Soviet offer of 4 million rubles to the United Nations Technical Assistance Fund for aid to underdeveloped areas in 1953 further underscores the ability of the Soviets to export capital as well as socialist technology.

Finally, such a proposal could conceivably receive relatively wide political support on the home front. Persons and organizations having a vested interest in increased sales of consumer goods include many people not ordinarily found in the progressive camp, particularly a large number of farmers as well as small manufacturers and distributors of consumer goods.

Even President Eisenhower might appreciate the opportunity to get the American farmers off his back. Increased sales of farm products is certainly the simplest and most desirable way to maintain agricultural parity. It is possible, of course, to expand the political use of food gifts to win friends and influence wavering people in the capitalist camp. But there is one important disadvantage to this "solution"—it can only be financed at the expense of American taxpayers who are already demanding immediate relief.

At a time when farmers are voting to cut production, when automobile, television, and other durable consumer goods manufacturers are planning cutbacks for 1954, it would seem most timely to ask the question: Are all these cuts really necessary? The answer is no—provided international trade can be made into a three-way street.

"YOU AIN'T SEEN NOTHING YET!"

Tonight, one American newspaper man jokingly complained to one of the Soviet guests [at an informal party given by a group of American correspondents in Moscow] that the rush of news in the last fortnight had kept him very busy. The Soviet guest laughed and said in good American slang, "Brother, you ain't seen nothing yet!"

—New York Times, April 6, 1953

IMMODESTY PLOT LAID TO REDS

TARRAGONA, Spain, Aug. 18 (AP)—Spain's enemies are trying to destroy her religious unity by introducing immodest clothes in the country, Benjamin Cardinal Arriba Castro, Archbishop of Tarragona, charged in a pastoral letter made public today. He said Communists were supporting a campaign under which foreigners appear in scanty bathing and other costumes.

—New York Times, August 19, 1953

CONTEST

One copy of any MR Press book is offered as a prize for the clearest brief (not more than 100 words) translation into plain English of the following passage from an article entitled "Indemnification of Corporate Officers and Directors for Expenses Incurred in Litigation," by Herbert L. Abrons, *New York Law Journal*, November 12, 1953, p. 1062:

. . . the fact is that there are certain types of crimes, such as violations of the anti-trust laws, which an individual might commit *only because* he is an officer, director or employee of a corporation, and *only because* he is, or thinks he is, in pursuit of the corporation's best interests.

For a corporation to let objections of a logical nature stand in the way of giving such a person a right to indemnity might well be pennywise and pound foolish. As a practical matter, we know that the management of corporations, particularly large or aggressive corporations, is constantly exposed to the risk of criminal indictment under the anti-trust laws and other statutes in the realm of business regulation. Aggressive management involves the taking of risks, and if stockholders expect their personnel to be aggressive, they should be ready at least to indemnify them against the expense of defending themselves when those risks lead to exposure to criminal suit. It is not enough to tell management that the corporation can always provide reimbursement if it chooses to do so. The management is entitled to know whether it can *compel* the corporation to provide reimbursement. The corporation that refuses to give its management an absolute right to reimbursement for the expense of defending against criminal charges can expect a conservative leadership which will hesitate to take any step that might possibly expose itself to a criminal charge. On the other hand, the corporation that does give its management an absolute right of reimbursement may be rewarded with leadership that is not afraid to take risks.

Following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion would lead a corporation to grant a right of reimbursement to its personnel for the defense of criminal actions, *even if they are found guilty*, so long as their guilt does not involve breach of any duty they owe to the corporation.

Words were invented by man to describe action. Use them for their original purpose.

—Dr. Norman Bethune

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Bermuda and After

Three chiefs of state—from London, Paris, and Washington—met in Bermuda early in December for an informal, off-the-record talk. The Bermuda Conference was the Eisenhower substitute for Churchill's original proposal that Malenkov be included in a Big Four meeting. After the Bermuda talks, the three higher-ups issued a brief press release. Churchill and Laniel retraced their steps to London and Paris, respectively, and Eisenhower hurried to New York for a scheduled speech before the United Nations.

The Big Three press release declared that (1) the three participants were united in purpose; (2) "the North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the foundation of our common policy"; (3) the three governments will ease world tensions by "reassuring all nations" that the strength of the West will not be used "in any cause of wrongful violence"; (4) in the Far East "we will continue to work together to restore peace and stability"; (5) "our sole aim is to foster and assure peace."

"Peace" was the last word in the Bermuda press release, but to this "peace" with which the British, French, and American chiefs of state concluded their announcement, there are four preconditions.

First, the continued private ownership of the means of production.

Second, maintenance of the competitive struggle for wealth and power known as private enterprise.

Third, Communism to be contained and in the course of time Communist areas to be restored to the profiteers.

Fourth, the United States to be in the saddle, leading the parade of white, Christian civilizers.

These four preconditions to peace are unacceptable to the great majority of the human race.

Bermuda marked the end of an epoch. At its beginnings, in 1944-1945, the planet buzzed with talk about one world and its representative, the United Nations, as an instrument of order and peace. The Soviet Union, China, and India were parts of that one world.

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At Bermuda, three white, Christian, westerners "re-enforced our solidarity, strengthened our resolve and fortified our hopes"—to dominate mankind. They favored the Atlantic alliance but did not mention the United Nations. Churchill spoke for a disintegrating empire, Laniel for a moribund, feeble France, Eisenhower for American billionaire war profiteers and stockpiles of atom bombs. Bermuda provided convincing evidence that the United States was cock of the Western walk and boss of the show.

United States the Upstart

Fifty years ago, the United States was a second-rate world power, except for three advantages. It possessed immense natural resources; it was isolated by ocean barriers from the wars of Europe and Asia; and it was unified on a continent-wide basis. Those three advantages, coupled with the havoc of four decades of world-wide war, have pushed the United States into a position where it can steal the show as Eisenhower did at Bermuda, and go it alone, as the United States has done since 1946 (when the Truman administration decided to get tough with Russia) and 1947 (when the President announced his intention of by-passing the United Nations and giving direct, unilateral, economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey). After these beginnings, the go-it-alone decisions expressed in the Marshall Plan, the Korean "police action," the organization of NATO, and the attempt to establish a European Defense Community followed as a matter of course. "Saving" Europe, "restoring" Europe, "arming" Europe, occupying European air and naval bases and patrolling European waters—these developments were a logical result of the contrast between the war-gutted European nations and the profit-bloated, re-tooled and re-equipped United States of North America.

These spectacular developments led John Foster Dulles to turn aside from his international Big-Business law practice and attempt to mastermind the entire postwar Western development.

Dulles Doctrine

Dulles uses his head; he is shrewd, far-sighted. He is for the main chance, and within the narrowing framework of his obligations and responsibilities as legal adviser and solicitor for the American Oligarchy, he has spotted the main chance all through his life. He has read some history and has a sense of mission as a history-maker. He is clumsy at times and undiplomatic. During this postwar development, however, Dulles, the corporation lawyer, has approached as near to the stature of statesmanship as anyone now in Washington.

Dulles has formulated a conception of the tasks facing the United States Oligarchy and a policy for putting his theory into action. On several recent occasions, such as his September 1953 talk to the American Legion and his December address to the National Press Club, he has outlined his theory and formulated his policy.

Dulles thinks of civilization as having fixed or permanent values. To him, Western civilization is the best possible world under existing circumstances—a synonym for freedom and an anteroom to the Christian Heaven, which is the absolute good.

Opposite this absolute good, Dulles places the absolute evil—Communism. For each virtue in Western civilization—freedom, justice, democracy—Dulles finds a vice in Communism—slavery, injustice, despotism.

Dulles is a Christian optimist. In the final act of his cosmic drama, good triumphs over evil; Western civilization and its virtues win out and destroy Communism and its vices. Therefore the virtues of civilization are enduring, permanent, while the vices of Communism are impermanent, transitory.

During its impermanent and unhappy existence, Communism is materialistic, greedy, grasping, aggressive, ruthless. It knows no law except violence and respects nothing so much as armed force. Therefore it is forever suspect and never to be trusted. If civilization and Communism are to co-exist, it must be in terms of an armed truce—peace, of sorts, established and maintained by military might.

Secretary Dulles has no copyright on this formula. It is the social catechism of the American Oligarchy, accepted by Truman as it is by Eisenhower. On the basis of the formula, the wicked and monstrous enemy, from its lair in the Kremlin, intended to launch a military attack on West Europe as soon as it recovered from its 1941-45 war losses.

Doctrinal Error

All doctrine is liable to error, the Dulles Doctrine included. From the beginning of the cold war, two propositions were advanced by the advocates of a West European army. The first proposition was that the Soviet Union intended to launch a surprise military attack on West Europe. The date for this attack was definitely placed in 1951 or 1952. The second proposition was that if the West mobilized sufficient armed forces in time, the Soviet Union would be deterred from making its attack. Since the West European Army is not yet in existence, and since Moscow has had public notice for years of the Western intent to create it, it seems obvious that if the Kremlin

had intended to strike, it could have done so at any time before the establishment of the West European Army.

Dulles, in his latest utterances, pulls the props from under his own doctrine by frankly admitting that "when NATO was organized in 1950, many thought that general war would come quickly." (National Press Club speech, December 22, 1953.) "The danger of open military aggression from Soviet Russia was less than it had been a year or two before." "It would seem that the Soviet rulers' exploitation of their own and satellite peoples has reached a point when it would be reckless for them to engage in general war."

The Dulles Doctrine was unsound logically when it was launched in 1946. The history of the intervening period has proved it wrong as a matter of fact. The USSR has not attacked. It does not attack. It does not even threaten. That admission by Dulles at the National Press Club on December 22, 1953, knocked his doctrine into a cocked hat.

Mr. Dulles proposes to put his doctrine into effect by unifying and thus saving West Europe, but the West Europeans object to his philanthropy, refuse to be unified and saved. France is the most vocal among the heel-draggers, but Italy is an insistent second, and Britain a persistent third. Therefore it was at France that Dulles shook his finger, when he said in Paris on December 14, 1953, that "if the European Defense Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart, so that they would again be potential enemies, then indeed, there would be grave doubt whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy." Mr. Dulles added, in his National Press Club speech: "The day of decision cannot be indefinitely postponed." Originally, the treaty providing for the West European army was to be ratified in six months. "Now eighteen months have elapsed and there is no firm assurance of early action."

Capitalism (the "free world," "western civilization") must be saved, Dulles argued before the National Press Club. "We owe that duty not only to ourselves but to the cause of western civilization which is entrusted to our keeping." NATO, under Dulles leadership, proposes to safeguard "the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of our peoples."

Washington is today the organizer and titular head of three regional leagues of nations—NATO in the Atlantic area, ANZUS in the Pacific, and Pan-America in the Western Hemisphere. With British-French help, if possible, Washington aims to direct the West and dominate the world. If need be, as Mr. Dulles suggested at Paris,

Washington will shift its junior partners, take on Germany, Spain, and Italy, link Japan with this Western clerico-fascist combination, and proceed toward the same objectives.

Dulles Describes NATO

Secretary Dulles told the National Press Club: "Fourteen nations have joined together to create a defensive organization committed to protect the security of a large area. This area is an area vital to the defense of freedom. NATO comes closer than anything that has yet been developed to be an effective international police force."

Since 1950, as Mr. Dulles sees it, a powerful, regional league of North American and European nations has been developed. This league is a child of United States policy and is being guided in the way that it should go by the State Department. Said Mr. Dulles: "The United States has made the largest single contribution to arming and equipping the NATO forces. We have put some \$11,000,000,000 into that phase of our effort." He added: "The project is so vital and the involvement in it is so large that it deserves careful supervision."

NATO is an instrument of power politics, forged in North America, financed by Washington and designed to supplant the United Nations as a means of enforcing Washington-London-Berlin policy decisions.

Brotherly Love in Philadelphia

Philadelphia teachers and their Teachers Union local were subjected, during November 1953, to a three-day televised inquisition. The show was staged by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. A member of the union, not called before the Committee, has written me this comment:

Sixteen teachers, all Jewish, appeared before the Committee during the three-day session. All invoked the Fifth Amendment after being told that the Committee had sworn testimony (though not identified) that they had been to certain meetings (naming same), had collected funds, and so on. One teacher said he would answer any questions about himself if he would be assured he would not be asked about anyone else. The Committee said "We aren't making any deals."

Our principal sat at our school television for three whole days and teachers brought their lunches and rushed in at free periods to watch. They kidded about who had the popcorn concession; made a "Roman Holiday" of the whole thing. One school took

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all their social studies classes to watch it on television as lessons in Americanism! Teachers were vicious. No unity or kind words or sympathy for the poor victims. Two days later the school board suspended the whole sixteen. The past president of our union who has been a principal for 22 years and had 28 years service in Philadelphia was loved by all teachers and students alike. Faculty and parents were organizing to fight for him, but after he was so treated on the television, and with no dignity left, returning to his school they refused to talk to him. Next day he resigned. The teachers in the high school next to our school (three of them) who were before the Committee and cameras, were spit on and kids opened their doors and threw things at them and called names. Well, it lasted for two days. Friday they were all suspended. They are to have hearings within the next month before the Board of Education, who are very hostile. The Velde Committee said if the Board of Education didn't cooperate, they too would be subpoenaed if they didn't take steps.

No one has tenure now. Its the usual story. They were outstanding teachers. But unlike the New York story, where principals appeared in their behalf, *nobody* said or did anything for these teachers. Of course the union mimeograph machine is turning out explanations of the use of the Fifth Amendment, etc. But in our school, nobody would even be caught *reading* the union bulletin board. The hysteria and fear are terrific. Some parents are keeping their kids out of school, so I've heard, till *all* subversive teachers are thrown out.

Lions and Jackals

U.S. News and World Report for December 11, 1953, carried a story that reflects the immediate future of the "free world" like a plate-glass mirror. India, whose railway equipment is traditionally British, needs 480 new locomotives. British manufacturers bid on the locomotive order, and lost. Four of their competitors got the business. German concerns will build 270 of the locomotives; Japanese concerns, 125; Austrian, 60; and Italian, 25.

There is the picture. With building capacity greater than market demand, private enterprises in the "free" nations are renewing the jungle struggle for pelf and power. It is a time-honored struggle, waged again and again by the greedy and the power-hungry, and always leading up to the competitive free-for-all called war. Always the lions have eliminated one another first. Later, organized destruction and mass murder have liquidated even the jackals.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT

By Arthur Eggleston

"GET IT AND GET OUT!"

The job the newly-packed National Labor Relations Board is doing to narrow labor's rights under the Taft-Hartley Act has aroused all sections of the labor movement. Even the railroad unions may be brought into the struggle, which will manifest itself chiefly in the 1954 Congressional elections.

Eisenhower's appointees are now engaged in amending the law, without benefit of Congressional action and precisely along the lines demanded by the NAM, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, and the worst reactionaries in and out of Congress. The new chairman, Guy Farmer, after a term with the old NLRB as a pseudo-New Dealer, has represented employers in labor cases for several years. He appears to be still representing them, but now in a more powerful position. The other Republican appointee, Philip Ray Rodgers, was an aide to the late Senator Taft and helped write the Taft-Hartley Act. A third new appointee, Albert C. Beeson, is a corporation labor relations executive who also headed a county employers' council in California. If he doesn't bring an Associated Farmers' approach to labor problems to the Board, he's been wasting his time in California.

Beeson's appointment early last month will enable Farmer and Rodgers to break a deadlock on some 20 cases and reverse decisions favorable to labor. The holdover members of the Board, Abe Murdock and Ivar Peterson, have opposed the attempt to reverse long-standing NLRB policies in these cases and have opposed Farmer's attempt to rewrite the labor law to suit anti-labor critics of the old Board, which was mild enough in its defense of labor's rights. Murdock is a former Representative and Senator from Utah and was a minority member of the House Special Committee, headed by Howard Smith of Virginia, which did a thorough hatchet job on the Wagner Act and the Labor Board from 1938 to the time when Taft-Hartley was "conceived in ill-will and born in malice." Smith's conduct of those earlier hearings, strongly opposed by Murdock, was one of the most disgraceful and dishonest performances ever put on by a Congressional committee, and that takes in a lot of territory. But it paved the way for the biased

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labor law which the Eisenhower Labor Board is in the process of making more biased.

Recent decisions and statements by Farmer indicate that unless blocked by the courts, the last vestiges of what remains of labor's protections carried over from the Wagner Act will be wiped out. The United Mine Workers *Journal* for December 1, 1953, said that this has already happened: "... any slight flavor of the Wagner Act has vanished into thin air." The *CIO News* in the December 28, 1953, issue said: "While Administration and congressional circles gravely discuss what Taft-Hartley amendments will be proposed ... the National Labor Relations Board has been doing a thorough-going job of sharpening the teeth of the law."

The *AFL News-Reporter* for December 25, 1953 said: "Almost without exception, the new board's decisions have had the effect of strengthening employers and weakening unions." *Labor's Daily* commented editorially on January 5, 1954: "The NLRB under its new chairman, Guy Farmer, is busily engaged in rewriting former decisions so as voluntarily to slice its jurisdiction and to deprive workers of the federally-guaranteed protection of collective bargaining and fair play."

An odd development in this growing controversy shows the desperation of labor in the face of the deliberate sabotage of the law by the agency charged with enforcing it. The *New Jersey Labor Herald*, quoted in *Labor's Daily* on December 4, 1953, declared editorially:

The National Labor Relations Board, once regarded as the champion of workers' economic rights, has ended up as management's "hatchet man." Taft-Hartley was bad enough. But the new big brass heading the board will make it even worse. And oddly enough, the 11 United States Courts of Appeal whose history has certainly not been pro-union, may eventually wind up as a buffer against further encroachment of labor's bargaining and organizational rights.

An editorial by Willard Shelton in *Labor's Daily* for January 5, 1954, entitled "Labor and the Courts," declared: "The Supreme Court may turn out, in the new year, as the last line of defense of the rights of labor against the Eisenhower-packed membership of the National Labor Relations Board."

This may be a bit of a weak reed for labor to lean upon. Courts, too, follow the election returns. And their pronouncements on labor matters, often rendered unrealistic by ingrained class feeling, are uneven, to say the least. A case in point is the Supreme Court decision early in December stripping the protection of the labor law from employees if they are found to have been "disloyal" to their employer.

Television technicians on strike at Charlotte, North Carolina criticized the quality of the station's programs. They were fired. The NLRB dismissed their complaint on the grounds that, in disparaging the employer's product, they had not mentioned that a labor dispute existed. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the Board, and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court. This new test of whether a worker has protection under the act may prove capable of indefinite expansion and application. Dissenting Justices Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter declared Taft-Hartley does not list "disloyalty" as a reason for discharge, that this was "new law" and that the vagueness of the term "loyal" throws the door open to individual judgments by board members and judges. It also opens the door to the informer-labor spy, the framing of active labor leaders. Let's hope the Supreme Court finds a way to isolate this iniquitous decision.

About the best labor can hope for, outside of a new Congress that will vote a new labor law and abolish this employer-minded Labor Board, is that it may take a long time for the courts to reverse themselves completely and nullify the body of labor relations law which has been built up in the last 18 years.

The overall reversal that has taken place in the enforcement of Taft-Hartley is the abandonment by the new NLRB of the belief that the national government should be concerned with whether workers are blocked or encouraged in their organizing attempts. The present board's apparent view is that it, and the government, should be strictly neutral as between Ben Fairless of U. S. Steel, for example, and Joe Blow, one of his approximately 200,000 workers. Actually this is a complete reversal of long-standing national policy which held that unions were a good thing and should be protected and encouraged. The new Board's view coincides with long-standing NAM policy which has held for over half a century that unions are evil things and should be discouraged. It also coincides with the real intent of Taft-Hartley, though not with the camouflaged language of the act which gives labor a chance in court.

As far as Congress is concerned, the Eisenhower Labor Board may have a completely free hand in carrying out its program. All signs point to the fact that Congress would like to duck this issue because of the elections. The dilemma is that by ducking it, Congress is making it an election issue, particularly in view of what the Board is doing to the law as it is written. Nothing can be expected from Eisenhower, who before election, termed Taft-Hartley "basically sound," and in his recent message to Congress proposed inconsequential changes coupled with a significant strike-breaking proposal. Although the NAM is screaming for a tougher law, this is probably a tactic

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to insure that it will not be made easier on labor. Labor itself can well be apprehensive at any opening up of the law for amendment by the present Congress. The best it could get would be minor, meaningless changes. Thus labor's only hope seems to be a more liberal and labor-minded Congress or—a drastic step—to follow the advice and example of John L. Lewis, the International Typographical Union, and a few more in boycotting the NLRB and the law. This would require concerted action and the complete abandonment of raiding. The chances for anything like this are slim.

The railroad unions are involved in this controversy because Taft-Hartley is being used in an attempt to strip them of rights they hold under the Railway Labor Act. Rail unions can now negotiate union shop and union security agreements even in the thirteen states where such union security measures are outlawed. Taft-Hartley, however, is subordinate to state laws which are more restrictive of labor's rights. The railway labor law is being tested in court in this regard. A decision adverse to the railroad workers might mean increased political activity all along the line to change the complexion of Congress.

The GOP Board's program can be described briefly. It is to increase the actions that an employer can take to block a union from organizing, and to decrease the number of actions workers can engage in to organize. The AFL, quoted above, put it even more succinctly: the Board is strengthening the employers and weakening the unions. It is attempting to relinquish a large part of its jurisdiction to the states, where powerful employers have usually had more influence. It wants to make unions go through the interminable processes of NLRB elections even though there is overwhelming evidence that the union has a majority of members. It seeks to remove the "protections" of the law from a union, and that means thousands and sometimes hundreds of thousands of workers, if just *one* union officer is *accused* of filing a false non-Communist oath. It seeks to make unions liable for the acts of individual workers and individual workers liable for the acts of unions, *unless those workers turn on the union and publicly dissociate themselves from its policies and acts*. It is making it almost impossible for an employer to be found guilty of the most flagrant unfair labor activities. It encourages an employer to stall on bargaining for a year; then declares the union's certification has lapsed.

The attempt to wipe out the rights of workers on the basis of "guilt by accusation" was recently slapped down by the District and Appeals Courts of the District of Columbia. "To impose this penalty upon the great mass of innocent union members is as reckless as firing a shotgun into a crowd of people in an attempt to stop one who is picking their pockets," said the Court of Appeals. The NLRB thereupon very quietly and somewhat sneakily suspended the McCarthyite

policy ruling it had made with such fanfare a few months before.

One other court decision which encourages labor but which the present Board makes meaningless, was a Supreme Court decision that state courts have no power to handle labor-management disputes where the Taft-Hartley law gives jurisdiction to the NLRB. In one case, an auto sales firm discharged employees for union activities (is that still going on?) and refused to bargain with a union. It claimed



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it was not in interstate commerce. In another, a state court enjoined peaceful picketing for organizational purposes on the ground it violated state law. The Supreme Court declared Taft-Hartley was paramount. In both cases it disagrees with Farmer, Rodgers, and presumably Beeson. But the members of an administrative agency not only have a sacred trust to enforce the law that is put in their charge; they have an excellent opportunity to sabotage and disregard that law. It takes years to catch up with them. On the theory that this

is a "hit-and-run" administration, none of them care very much. Good corporation jobs are waiting. "Get it and get out!" seems to be the slogan. Otherwise, how can you account for the brazen, unblushing corruption of office and function that is going on?

Let's hope that all of labor combined can make the last part of the slogan come true in '54.

THE IRISH REVOLUTION: A COMMUNICATION

BY SHAEMAS O'SHEEL

A word of thanks for Andrew Boyd's lucid comments on current Irish conditions, in his essay "Nationalism and Labor in Ireland." His summary of the revolution of 1916-1921, however, involves statements, implications, and inferences with which old-time Irish Nationalists in this country do not concur.

If anyone marvels at an American traversing an account of Irish happenings by an Irishman, let me say that many Irish happenings happen in the United States, where since the 1850s the majority of the Irish have lived. As Mr. Boyd notes, the modern Irish republican movement was born in this country in 1858. Most of the money and many of the men involved in the Fenian rising of 1867 came from America, whence also the Land League and the Parliamentary Party drew their chief financial support. From 1871 to his death in 1928, John Devoy, greatest of latter-day Irish rebels, lived and plotted in New York. From that city Tom Clarke returned to Dublin to recruit such ardent young men as the Pearse brothers, MacDonagh, and Plunkett into revolutionary ranks. The Irish in America achieved liaison with the German government, sent Roger Casement to Germany, arranged for the shipment of German arms and munitions, financed the Easter Rising, and immediately afterward raised the Irish Relief Fund to succor the widows, orphans, and dependents of men killed or imprisoned in Easter Week (somehow, some of this money went to buy arms for a resumption of the struggle!). The

Shaemas O'Sheel's qualifications to write on the subject of the Irish Revolution are set forth in the text of his commentary. Mr. Boyd's two-part article appeared in the October and November issues of MR.

Friends of Irish Freedom, founded in New York in 1916, grew to a membership of hundreds of thousands after the Irish Race Convention at Philadelphia in February 1919, raised a large Victory Fund, made possible the sale of millions of dollars' worth of Irish Republic Bond Certificates, was a chief factor in the defeat of Wilsonism in 1920, and would have brought about the inclusion of a plank in the Republican Party platform that year, favorable to Irish independence, but for an intervention to be noted anon.

As to my competence to write of these matters: from 1903 I was active in the Gaelic revival and in the Irish Nationalist cause; later a member of Clan-na-Gael, the American wing of the Irish Republican Brotherhood; for years a confidant of John Devoy and his astute American-born colleague, Judge Daniel F. Cohalan; a fundraiser and organizer for the Friends of Irish Freedom; and in the Winter of 1919-20, as director of the Irish Bond Certificate Drive in the Borough of Manhattan, I banked nearly \$450,000 in the name of Eamon De Valera. I was the author of three resolutions introduced in the House of Representatives in 1916 and 1917, of great importance to the Irish cause; I shall not ask space to name or describe them here, except to say that the Dyer Resolution (May 1916) brought an end overnight to the British military murders of the leaders of the Easter Rising.

Mr. Boyd credits De Valera with rejecting, in 1921, Lloyd George's offer of a measure of autonomy for Ireland on condition that six northern counties be partitioned off; and accuses Arthur Griffith, "easily swayed by blandishments or threats," and "never really a Republican," of causing his colleagues on the delegation which resumed parleys with the British later that year, to accept an "infamous treaty" calling not for a Republic but for a mere Free State, minus the six counties. Mr. Boyd admits that the British won this agreement by threat of "total war," adding that Michael Collins, a soldier but no politician, "may have" taken the threat seriously. He then implies that all who accepted the Treaty (including, as he fails to say, a majority of Dail Eireann), were "satisfied" with a truncated Free State within the British Commonwealth, while only those who started a ferocious but foredoomed civil war were simon-pure republicans—led by Eamon De Valera. No blame to Mr. Boyd for believing what De Valera's propagandists have repeated for 35 years; but perhaps in fairness you will let me relate how the events of 1916-1921 are remembered by old-line Irish Nationalists.

Led by Devoy and Cohalan, the Friends of Irish Freedom began the fight against American adherence to the League of Nations, believing it dangerous to American interests and fatal to Irish aspirations. As the Friends waxed in numbers and resources, the most as-

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tute leaders of the Republican Party became sold on the strategy of making the League *the* issue in the 1920 Presidential election, wooing the Irish vote, and backing the cause of Irish freedom. Thus a most favorable situation was evolving when Eamon De Valera landed in New York in June, 1919.

Surely this brave soldier and able commander in the Easter Rising at once sought out the leaders of the Clan-na-Gael and the Friends of Irish Freedom? Alas, no; first he conferred for some days with Carmelite fathers, and pseudo-socialists, and persons of the unstable sort who can never conform to the disciplines of organized solidarity. When finally he came out of hiding and met with Devoy, Cohalan, and other Irish-American leaders, De Valera took early occasion to tell them that he was "not a doctrinaire republican." Demanding, and getting, \$100,000 for expenses, he toured the country addressing meetings arranged by the Clan and the Friends, but never mentioned these organizations, their leaders, or their press, while praising minor groups and leaders, and rival newspapers. Evoking wild enthusiasm as "President of the Irish Republic," he took no pains to remind his adulators that he was merely President of Dail Eireann.

When it was found that Irish Republic Bonds could not be sold in this country since that Republic was not recognized by our government, De Valera agreed to sell Bond Certificates, but did nothing to still the whispers, "Devoy and Cohalan won't let him sell bonds, they don't want money raised for the Republic." He insisted on setting up separate machinery to sell the certificates, but the selling was done 90 percent by members of the Clan and the Friends. Midway of the drive, De Valera astounded Ireland and America by proposing that Britain grant Ireland "independence" under a plan like the Platt Amendment by which the United States claimed a right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba. He knew that the American leaders must need protest this folly, and when John Devoy did criticize it in temperate terms, he encouraged the cry, "Devoy and Cohalan are attacking the President." When in 1914 John Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, pledged Irish support to Britain, his chief supporters here became reconciled with the Clan-na-Gael; but some of their followers, petty and vengeful, now led the pack of new, inexperienced enthusiasts who at clamorous meetings almost cried for Devoy's and Cohalan's blood. The next logical step was soon taken; a rival organization to the Friends of Irish Freedom was set up. Vast sums of the money raised by the Clan and the Friends were now used to attack them—and meanwhile *not a dollar's worth of arms or munitions was sent to the desperately needy Irish Republican Army, grimly battling British regulars and murderous Black-and-Tans!*

Came the Republican National Convention of 1920. Judge Cohalan drafted a platform plank declaring that the people of Ireland should have such form of government as they desired; and it was accepted. De Valera went to Chicago attended by a numerous rabble who staged torchlight parades and hysterically called on the Republicans to promise recognition of the Irish Republic. When De Valera learned of the adoption of the Cohalan plank, he denounced it violently; and it came out of the platform.

Thus when De Valera met Lloyd George, he negotiated strictly from weakness, and both men knew it. The British had held back from "total war" only in fear of American sentiment, informed by a powerful, united Irish movement in the United States which might even induce the Republicans, clearly destined to win in 1920, to champion Irish right. De Valera had eased the British of that fear. He had split the American Irish, he had slapped the Republicans in the face, and he had shown clearly that no part of the more than \$5 million banked in his name would go to arm the boys fighting on the hills, begging their adjutants for guns, sometimes even for a single bullet. Mick Collins not only "may have believed" that the British would turn to "total war"—he knew damn well they would!

Let me make these final points: De Valera, almost unknown in Ireland, never heard of in America until after Easter Week, came to power solely because he was the senior officer of the Irish fighting forces left alive when the Dyer Resolution called halt to British military murders. Arthur Griffith was indeed not "really a republican," but I doubt he was easily swayed by blandishments, and he was the last man that could be moved by threats. Mick Collins was a soldier all right, but it is only necessary to read Darrel Figgis' *Recollections of the Irish War* and Frank O'Connor's *Death in Dublin* to perceive that he was no tyro as a politician. And last of all: At the time of the Truce and the Treaty, not De Valera, not Griffith, but Collins, was the head of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood; he and his colleagues on the Revolutionary Council were responsibly charged with deciding how much of the national objective could at that time be realized, and what compromises must be accepted. Their decision was ratified by a Dail, the majority of whose members were members of the IRB. Thus the civil war, begun by heroic men like Cathal Brugha and Art O'Connor, but adroitly taken over by Eamon De Valera, was—counter-revolution!

The history of intellectual progress is written in the lives of infidels. Political rights have been preserved by traitors—the liberty of the mind by heretics.

—Robert G. Ingersoll

LETTERS FROM A VISITOR TO CHINA, JULY 1953

BY JOAN ROBINSON

PART IV

The Land Reform

"I thought before I went that there must be some good landlords, but I did not find one." Many intellectuals and students went into the country to help with the Land Reform. The general principles were laid down in the law, but the detailed application was worked out in each village. The reason for sending the intellectuals was partly to help the peasants with the sums involved in counting up the acreage but still more to open the eyes of the highbrows to the true state of affairs and to cure them of sentimental feelings about the hard fate of the landlords.

Now the hurricane has blown out and the landlords who have survived it have settled down to work with their neighbors. They retained the same share of land as was given to the poor peasants, and after five years they will be eligible for restoration of their civil rights.

You must not think of dukes, nor yet of village squires. Here ten or twelve acres was a large estate and the landlord was not much better educated than the peasant. A large part of the income that the landlords squeezed out of the country came from usury and from cuts out of taxes that they were responsible for collecting (not to mention exactions compared to which the *droit du seigneur* seems moderate).

When I visited a village near Peking I was taken to see an ex-landlord's family; the man was out with a cart and the wife and daughter talked to me. They had evidently been let down lightly as they had a better house and furniture than the peasants. I found it rather shy-making, and of course they had to say the right thing in the presence of the village elders who were showing me round. I had the impression that mama was a bit too eager to say her piece and earn some good marks, but the girl seemed to regard the whole

Mrs. Robinson, the distinguished British economist who teaches at Cambridge, was a visitor to New China during the past summer, with a delegation of businessmen organized by the British Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

business as a joke against her parents. "It is much healthier to work. Formerly father had no appetite, but now he is always hungry for his meals."

It was exhilarating to talk to the peasant leaders—the head of the village, the secretary of the co-op, and the leader of the women's federation—because they themselves were so keen and interested. The improvement in crop yields, sales from the village shop, the organization of their first co-operative farm—it had all opened a new world of intellectual interest, as well as the solid satisfaction of having more to eat, and was calling out talents they had not known that they possessed.

The head man was a hearty shrewd blunt-featured type. The secretary of the co-op, with a brown bony face and fine hands, might have been a don with his precise exposition and his sense of evidence (the decline in consumption of coarse grain as a symptom of prosperity).

Chinese poverty is something that a western imagination can hardly take in. Formerly, many of the villagers had only one suit (and I was told elsewhere of sisters with one pair of trousers between them so that they took it in turns to go out), now each has two at least. I was shown cake made from the husks of beans after the oil has been extracted which formerly people ate but which are now fed to the mules.

When it was the woman's turn to speak, it was like taking the cork out of a champagne bottle—flooding with words to make up for years of silence.

Will the transition to collective farming be made smoothly? That is the great question—the great test of the whole affair.

A once-and-for-all distribution of land is no permanent solution. It was made on the basis of so much per head: man, woman, and child (in some villages a baby not yet born was counted); in a few years births, deaths, and marriages will have made family sizes out of line with holdings. And sales of land are permitted (with certain restrictions), so that, left to itself, inequality would emerge again. Land reform was intended to be a break with the feudal past and the foundation for a socialist future, not a new system in itself.

There has been a big jump in crop yields already, due to better work and to investing the surplus formerly paid away in rent in fertilizers, insecticides, draft animals, and better plows; but clearly a thorough-going reorganization of agriculture will be necessary to increase yields further and to release manpower for industry. The great plains seem to cry out for mechanization. Will the peasants be ready to cooperate by the time industry is ready to provide the machinery?

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The policy is to use no compulsion but to educate the peasants to want the change.

Apart from some experimental state farms and a few collectives already organized in the North East (Manchuria), there are at present three stages of development—mutual aid teams formed *ad hoc* to get in a harvest, permanent teams, and co-operative farms. In my village, 42 of 449 families had formed a co-operative, pooling their land, organizing the crop program and the work in common, but retaining private ownership of the individual holdings. The co-operative owns the animals and tools and some carts with which supplementary income is earned for the group. The division of the distributable product is made as to 30 percent in respect to land contributed to the pool and as to 70 percent in proportion to work done, calculated on a system of points given for hours worked weighted by the skill required. The accountant is one of the peasants. At the monthly meeting each family is told its score of points and laggards are urged to increase their share. Geese and vegetable gardens are private, but the co-operative is beginning to experiment with vegetables.

Land tax is on a sliding scale with various allowances. It works out at about 15 percent of the main crops. Apart from this, agriculture contributes to the national economy through the element of tax and state profit in the prices of the goods bought. The prices of manufactures are still high, but, besides clothes and bedding, villagers are buying gumboots, bicycles, fountain pens, watches, and thermos flasks.

A village so near Peking is favorably placed for outside work and for marketing, and I presume that a good specimen would be chosen for the foreign visitor. I have no means of telling whether my village was above the average. It seemed to fit fairly well with whatever overall statistics are available.

I was told by an old Shanghai resident that villagers down there complain that the Land Reform has not done them any good. Many wealthy industrialists owned land there; and, having other sources of income, they were not always exacting about rent, and spent some money in the villages, so that part of the juice from industry was distributed to the countryside.

There are stories, too, of tax collectors being rough and arbitrary, but here "criticism and self-criticism" has been brought into play to correct the evil.

Taking it by and large, the substitution of 15 percent taxes for 50 percent rents, the provision of cheap loans, the organization of marketing through the co-ops, the provision of health services and of relief in floods and famines, the taming of the rivers, the elimination

of bandits, and the substitution of the disciplined, helpful and chaste Liberation Army for a soldiery hardly distinguishable from bandits—all these make up a substantial list of benefits to the countryside. Least ponderable but not least important is the access to education. The Chinese never lost the tradition that learning characters is the key to advancement, and now everyone from grandma downwards is eagerly seizing the opportunity to have a try.

Demography

China is bubbling over with babies. In Canton, the women who work in the fields and on the boats carry their babies in a scarf on their backs (imagine never being able to lean back all day!). On the river it is a common sight to see four or five children in a small boat, their only home, the baby on the mother's back and the next youngest tied by a string to stop him falling into the water. (There are schools afloat now, as the river children would not go ashore.)

Around Peking, women work less (one of the new rights the village woman was rejoicing in was being allowed to work out of doors) and the baby-minding is done by elder children. In the city you often see a man carrying a baby, and there are a few low double prams in wickerwork (wasteful in a Chinese family to have a pram for one). The streets are lined with toddlers playing about, very free and chirpy.

The first complete census ever to be taken is now being prepared in connection with the forthcoming elections. People are speculating as to whether the population will not be nearer to 600 million than to the traditional figure of 400 million.

The death rate, particularly infant and maternal deaths, has fallen sharply with the new health measures, and there are no signs of the birth rate having fallen, so that natural increase must have risen with a bound. There is also a trickle of immigration of overseas Chinese (we traveled with a trainload from the frontier—looking wayworn and grubby compared to the New Chinese).

No one will hear of Malthus. Birth control is too much associated with a pessimistic, defeatist, anti-Marxist view of life; they say that the cultivable area of China can be doubled (of mere space there is no lack, as the train journey through the Northeast and into Inner Mongolia brought home to me), and yields can be increased on existing land by scientific farming. But this is only to meet the Malthusian argument in its crudest form. It does not counter what seems to me the most cogent point—that the standard of life, in physical consumption and in culture and amenities, can be raised the faster the more investment goes into raising capital per head, as opposed to catering for more heads.

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There is a boundless internal reserve of labor waiting to be released by substituting capital equipment for the fantastically manpower-using methods of production now in operation, so that there can be no question of not having enough people to utilize the natural resources of China.

But it is of no use to argue with the economists. No doubt in time the universal unofficial trade union of women will take the matter in hand.

Economic Discipline

Railways and the bulk of heavy industry are nationalized; there is quite a large area of pure private enterprise in miscellaneous industry and trade. The mixed part of the economy, in staple products, is controlled through state wholesaling. The major part of all the main crops is bought from the peasantry (apart from the portion contributed as taxation) by a network of supply and marketing co-operatives and sold to government corporations. Prices are fixed by the corporations, price ratios being calculated to give an incentive to produce industrial crops such as cotton and tobacco (in both of which China has changed since Liberation from an importer to an exporter). Raw materials are partly sold to private industrialists, partly manufactured by them on commission, and partly used in government factories. Staple manufactures (cloth, soap, fertilizers) are also partly wholesaled by the corporations. Retailing in towns is predominantly private enterprise, but there are enough state department stores and urban consumer co-operatives to keep margins within bounds and set standards of quality. Retailing in the villages is more and more becoming dominated by the supply and marketing co-ops. There are also a growing number of handicraft co-operatives beginning to organize the great mass of artisan production.

The system depends on carrying sufficient stocks to be able to kill speculation. Under this method of control there is no need for price regulation by decree and no scope for a black market.

The inflation was mastered in March, 1950, and prices have been substantially stable ever since.

We hear some echoes of the great drive against the Five Vices and the Three Evils. This, like the Land Reform, was a hurricane that has blown over. The Five Vices of private enterprise were bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing information for private speculation. Accusations were brought by the workers against their employers and in the prolonged investigations there were many suicides, not so much from fear of the consequences of conviction as from shame at exposure.

An English industrialist who had been through it told me that the trade unions, as might be expected, showed excessive zeal in making accusations and were rough and high-handed. He himself had had some pretty nasty moments, and every business lost money during the paralysis of trade while the hurricane was blowing, but a man with patience and a clear conscience got pretty fair treatment in the end.

There is no suggestion that malpractices have crept back to any appreciable extent; the trade unions are on the lookout, though co-operation between labor and management for the sake of production is now the watchword.

The affair provides a commentary on the old liberal adage that light is the best antiseptic. We know what that amounts to when the light flickers from a Royal Commission once in twenty years; to have it turned on permanently from below is a very different matter.

The Three Evils among government employees were corruption, waste, and bureaucracy. These also were hunted out to the smallest detail. There is a new drive against bureaucracy going on now, which entails civil servants' spending a certain proportion of their time in the field to learn the reality of what they deal with on paper.

The anti-bureaucracy campaign is a necessary corrective to the Chinese passion for exact detail. The byword for a bureaucrat is the man who ordered the mosquitoes to be counted.

Technology

On the way up, I visited an exhibition at Mukden of local industrial products. The display of machine tools was impressive—all the more so when you consider that these massive docile robots will be for many years fellow producers with the little sweating blacksmiths of Peking.

China is a wonderful museum of economic history. A foreign engineer told me that he was startled to recognize a cupola from the first chapter of the textbook of his student days illustrating how pig iron was made 2,000 years ago, working next door to a huge automatic steel mill of the very latest design.

Another feature of the exhibition was a number of inventions made by miners and steel workers. One was a seamless chain (for greater strength), the links cut out from a solid bar of iron on the same principle that chains are made from jade.

An architect told me of numerous devices for speeding up construction that building workers have introduced (I leave you to draw the moral).

Travel Diary

Well, there you are. I have had a little glimpse at this huge event and I tell you what I can. It does not add up to a great deal, but in the prevailing state of ignorance at home I feel that any crumb of information is worth sharing.

To end, I will give you an outline of my journey, so that you can see how these snippets fit together.

I went to China with a group of businessmen organized by the British Council for the Promotion of International Trade. As I had no business to do I attended only the formal meetings and banquets and some group expeditions. Most of the time I was scouting around on my own, and I am traveling back alone.

I flew out to Hong Kong, overnighing at Colombo and Singapore. It was a startling experience to fly half round the world in four days, but it has become such a commonplace that I will not enlarge on it. Hong Kong is a very beautiful place to look at, where the rich live in particularly elegant flats and the poor in particularly horrible slums.

Crossing the frontier was dramatic. On one side we sat outside a restaurant too grubby to enter, eating sandwiches we had been warned to bring with us, or rather not eating them, for they were begged from us by pathetic scabby children, encouraged by their grownups. Through a fenced passage we came into a well-swept station, where waiting passengers were sitting on rows of benches reading. We were shown into a V.I.P.'s waiting room, charmingly furnished in the Chinese style and provided with fans and cups of tea. An emissary of our opposite number, the China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, had come down from Peking to look after us, and we were introduced to the student interpreters from Canton.

We were delayed some days in Canton where we were taken to see the museums in the Palace of Culture, a girls' school, and to the famous ivory carvers' shops; saw an opera and a football match; and had a fascinating trip down the river on the day of the Dragon Boat Festival.

I began to get something of the atmosphere of New China from the students. They traveled up with us to Peking, and it was a pleasure to find that we earned them a sight-seeing weekend there, which they lapped up as eagerly as we did.

The first day north from Canton is through lovely landscapes of rivers and green hills, the valleys full of rice fields. We spent some hours at Hankow, where the special coach provided for us was ferried over the Yangtse. Chinese official hospitality is organized with im-

agitative foresight and minute attention to detail. We were taken to a hotel and shown into rooms provided with every possible requirement down to a dressing gown and bedroom slippers. (In the same corridor were a delegation of Tibetans looking totally dazed.) After bathing, we were given an excellent European lunch and drove round the town—westernized and undistinguished apart from the great river (there was not time to go out to the famous West Lake). Then back to our train and a day and a half more through landscapes less beautiful but interesting for the different types of farming, the mud or brick-built villages, and the neat new houses of the railway workers.

So to Peking. Just over three weeks crammed with visits to the sights (on my own as well as conducted tours) and to institutions, talks with old and new friends, and a series of interviews with economic experts from various departments. I had a good deal of chat with English residents of various political complexions—a useful shortcut to much information about current affairs and about the bad old days.

I had a day in Mukden which is much like any great industrial town except for a miniature Forbidden City in the center. As in every country except Scotland, the northern type is more dour than the southern, but here too you see the smiling faces of New China.

Finally, a day between trains at Manchouli, a bleak railway town dumped down in the wild empty steppes of Inner Mongolia, a little humanized by gardens being planted and a great theatre in the Palace of Culture.

This lap of the journey was made in a new Chinese train—two-berth sleepers with every convenience, well chosen colors, and, needless to say, spotless. The other trains were about at the standard of our third-class sleepers, though of course cleaner.

I am writing now bowling across Siberia. I suppose I must prepare to meet skeptical smiles at home. It is more inconvenient to be disbelieved when you are lying, but it is more annoying when you are not.

*I speak truth, not so much as I would, but as much as I dare;
and I dare a little the more, as I grow older.*

—Montaigne, *Essays*, "Of Repentance"

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."
United States Constitution, Amendment IV.

"To secure these rights [Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness] Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Wherever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government." Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.

INQUISITORS

from Washington and various state capitols are striding up and down the United States asking citizens, privately and publicly, what papers they buy and read, whether they belong to this or that association, how they feel about controversial questions.

These inquisitors are public servants, subject to specific constitutional and legal limitations.

Citizens, who are being assaulted by the inquisitors, have individual rights of belief, thought, privacy, expression, and action.

Citizens as a body also hold the final authority, known as Popular Sovereignty. In the exercise of this authority they may dismiss their federal, state, city, and county public servants. Likewise, they may establish a new government, "laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them [the People] shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." (Declaration of Independence.)

Public authority, private association, personal dignity, and popular sovereignty all are involved in the witch hunts, smearings, persecutions, and prosecutions which are building a barrier of anti-Americanism between the United States and its world neighbors.

These and related matters are discussed in a 14,000 word pamphlet, just off the press, **TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE**, written by Scott Nearing and published by the Social Science Institute. You owe it to yourself, your family, the organizations to which you belong, and the nation and world of which you are a part, to read and study this new pamphlet, to understand its argument concerning the General Welfare, and to make the necessary preparations for putting its proposals into effect. Single copy 25 cents, five for one dollar, ten or more 17 cents each. Order a quantity, NOW, from

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(continued from inside front cover)

Quite apart from the number of copies distributed, the response to "The Roots and Prospects of McCarthyism" has been most gratifying. Many readers have commented on one or more aspects of the analysis, contributing valuable facts or insights which should enable us to do a better job of following and interpreting the political scene in the months ahead. And we were particularly pleased that the editors of the London *New Statesman & Nation* thought so well of the article that they made special room to print an abbreviated version of it in their issue of January 16th.

Leo Huberman's tour west is shaping up nicely, and we can now announce the following definite speaking dates: Chicago, February 26, the Woodrow Wilson Room (for tickets and further information, write to Miss Sarah Greenebaum, 1819 Lincoln Park West, Chicago 14); Los Angeles, March 5th, Unitarian Public Forum, 2936 West Eighth Street. Arrangements are being made for meetings in the San Francisco area, Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, and possibly intermediate cities. Data on specific times and places will be included in next month's Notes from the Editors.

MR's columnist, Scott Nearing, is also going on a speaking tour to the West Coast. Three meetings for MR subscribers and their friends are definitely set: 1) Los Angeles, February 28, details from Pauline Schindler, 835 North Kings Road, Los Angeles 46, Telephone—WHitney 0841. 2) Minneapolis and St. Paul, March 24-28, details from Sam Pavlovic, 76 West Summit Ave., St. Paul 2. 3) Chicago, April 9, details from Sarah Greenebaum, 1819 Lincoln Park West, Chicago 14. Data on additional meetings will be given next month.

We have received a number of interesting contributions in response to our invitation to discuss the pieces grouped under the heading "Problems of American Socialism" in the January issue. But almost all of them are too long, and in some cases much too long. We are returning these with the request that they be cut to a maximum of 1,000 words. Anyone planning to get into the discussion should take note of this limit. And one more point: leave out the familiar generalizations and address yourself to specific questions and problems. That, as we see it, is the way to make a discussion really useful.

The witch hunt, as many of you know from personal experience, operates not only at the national level but also in many parts of the country at the state level. Recently it reached the supposedly staid and sober state of New Hampshire where one of MR's editors lives. Both Paul Sweezy and his wife Nancy have been had up; both said they were never Communists; and both refused to answer questions about the Progressive Party on the ground that the activities of the Progressive Party are perfectly legitimate and none of the state government's business. As we go to press, the state Attorney General is considering whether to take the matter to court. In line with our policy of reporting on all of MR's encounters with the Inquisition, we will have a story on the New Hampshire affair when all the facts are in.

Notice to Subscribers in Chicago Area

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